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JCRC Middle East Briefings

Yesterday, the Jerusalem Post reported that PM Ariel Sharon told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iraq now poses "the biggest threat to the country." The following excerpts (emphasis added) from a report by former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens, issued yesterday by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, address the issue of missile proliferation in the Middle East, naming not only Iraq, but also Syria, Iran and Egypt as serious threats to Israel. The report can be found at www.jcpa.org.

The present Iraqi capability is relatively limited. According to recent U.S. estimates, Iraq may have a dozen or two Scud missiles that were not caught by UN inspectors. They are working to attain nuclear capability but do not have it at the moment. However, both the Iraqis and the Iranians have chemical warheads, and both probably have biological weapons as well.

During the Gulf War, Saddam thought that provoking Israel was a way to help break up the U.S.-led coalition he faced that included Arab countries, something that is not a factor this time. Indeed, Israel's situation today is much different and considerably better. With the Arrow system in place, Saddam must take into account that there is a high probability that any missile sent against Israel will be intercepted. If the missiles were to carry non-conventional warheads, not only would the missile be intercepted, but it would be revealed to the entire world that he had tried to send a missile with a non-conventional warhead against Israel.

It has been suggested that in the age of missile systems, borders are not really important anymore because missiles fly over borders. This might be the case if missiles were the only way of conducting war, but, as a matter of fact, no war has yet been won by missiles alone. Wars are still won by forces on the ground. So unless Israel can protect itself against enemy ground forces, even the most advanced missile interceptor system will not keep enemy tanks out of the streets of Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. Defensible borders still matter.

In the immediate future, the threat that Israel most likely will have to contend with, even if it is not the greatest threat in terms of destructive capability, is that of Syria with its 150 missiles, some of which may be armed with chemical or biological warheads. This kind of threat on Israel's doorstep obviously arouses very deep concern.

Current Missile Threats to Israel. The Syrians have over 150 ballistic missiles...The fact that the Syrians have such a quantity in their armory, and the fact that in Lebanon today shorter range rockets with sufficient range to hit the cities in northern Israel are deployed with Syrian and Iranian help, all have a strategic effect on the response of the Israeli government to various provocations on the northern border.

The Iranians are extending the missile capability that they originally received from North Korea to create long-range missiles like the Shahab. All in all, this provides a relatively cheap system that can have a substantial effect on the strategic situation, despite the fact that people who deal in design and evaluation of weapons systems would say that this is not really a very effective system.

Adding a non-conventional warhead changes the situation completely. Instead of something that can be classified as an irritant, these missiles could become an existential threat to the State of Israel and its citizens. Just about all of the countries in the area that have acquired or are producing these vintage ballistic missiles are in the process of trying to acquire non-conventional warheads. In some cases, they may already have done so.

According to intelligence estimates, the country that is closest to the possession of nuclear capability today is Iran...It used to be Iraq...By now it is generally accepted that the only reason Saddam did not have that capability [during the Gulf War] is because the Israeli Air Force knocked out his nuclear reactor back in 1981. The assumption today is that, as a result of the Gulf War and a few years of UN inspections in Iraq, Saddam Hussein's efforts to obtain nuclear capability have been set back considerably, although there is no doubt he is still trying....

In Iran, the attempt to develop nuclear weapons is being made without there having been any UN inspectors, and without anything substantial having been done to delay the effort...Iran is in the process of developing intermediate range (1,300-2,000 kilometer) ballistic missiles capable of hitting Israel and, eventually, even Europe.

It does not take a great stretch of the imagination to visualize what the world will be like if and when the Iranians develop a long-distance nuclear delivery capability. Iranian leaders have repeatedly declared that there will be no peace in the Middle East until Israel is destroyed. The Iranians are also funding, training, and encouraging the Hizballah in Lebanon to carry out hostile activities against Israel. The many medium- and short-range rockets deployed in Lebanon have come from Teheran, and Iranian Revolutionary Guard units are deployed throughout Lebanon.

The present Iraqi capability is relatively limited. According to recent U.S. estimates, Iraq may have a dozen or two Scud missiles that were not caught by UN inspectors. They are working to attain nuclear capability but do not have it at the moment. However, both the Iraqis and the Iranians have chemical warheads, and both probably have biological weapons as well.

The Egyptians in recent years have decided that they would also like to acquire a ballistic missile capability. Their armed forces is based almost totally on U.S. equipment obtained through U.S. foreign aid, totaling some $1.3 billion a year. The Egyptians are now diverting some of their scarce hard currency resources in order to purchase ballistic missiles from North Korea. The Libyans, who have plenty of hard currency, are doing the same.

So in the Middle East today, there are probably more ballistic missiles per square kilometer than exist anywhere else in the world. Any of these countries - the Ayatollahs in Iran, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, or even Bashar Assad in Syria - when in possession of this kind of capability are a danger to the world. They are certainly a danger to Israel, because [Israel is] located right in the center of the Middle East and a lot of the rhetoric of these countries' leaders is directed against Israel.

Israel's Response - The Arrow Interceptor. In recent years, Israel has developed the Arrow ballistic missile interceptor system, a system that was not available ... during the Gulf War, and one with a high probability and capability of intercepting ballistic missiles like the Scuds.

For many years, the defense community assumed that intercepting a missile was a mission impossible...Then along came President Reagan, who said we need a system that will be able to intercept missiles...Originally known as the "Star Wars" project, it was later called the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the Israeli development of the Arrow was initiated under this framework...Israel today has operationally deployed the Arrow system to provide an umbrella of coverage over the entire country against ballistic missiles that might be launched, for example, from Iraq.

Another advantage today...is the Israeli reconnaissance satellite. The advanced Ofek satellite provides [Israel] with photo reconnaissance for all of the Middle East...Today, if we are concerned about the areas from which missiles might be launched against Israel, we have our own intelligence capability.

All in all, Israel is in pretty good shape today as it faces many types of very unpleasant dangers in the region. Twelve years of intelligent investment of Israeli resources and the application of its scientific and engineering capabilities have moved us very substantially forward in being able to face the kind of threats that exist in the Middle East today.

On July 16, 2002, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution hosted a forum on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. At the first of three sessions, Jacob Perry, former head of Israel's Shin Bet security services, and Mohammad Dahlan, Palestinian Authority security advisor, presented their positions on the conflict. Following their remarks they answered questions from the assembled audience. Martin S. Indyk, Director of the Saban Center, moderated the discussion ( http://www.brook.edu/scholars/mindyk.htm). Excerpts of the Q&A session are below. Their entire remarks, and those of the additional two panels can be found at: http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/comm/transcripts/20020716.htm.

Q: ...We heard your point of view on the past...What do you suggest we do moving forward?

MR. DAHLAN: ...I know we talked about the past in order to educate, to explain the issue, because without understanding the past, we cannot move forward...I can tell you that the Authority and the Palestinian people now are more ready to reach a ceasefire and to move forward after this common tragedy. I believe that the measures for security reforms are going to be a basis for a renewal of the situation on the Palestinian domestic side...there are drastic and fundamental changes, reforms being carried out and the appointment of one individual in charge of security is a positive step....

Israel will find some very concrete measures and results in spite of the difficult circumstances that we are under. In addition to that, there's got to be some political action on the Palestinian side in order for this mission to succeed. This requires the involvement of a third party, like the United States of America, in order to bring the Israeli security establishment, as well as the Palestinian one, to work together side by side to bring back calm in a relatively short period of time in a measurable way. This would also require Israel to take some serious steps in order to allow the Palestinian security establishment to succeed. It would not be perceived to work only for the interests of Israel or be a proxy for Israel and so the Palestinian security establishment would not be perceived as part of the Israeli security establishment.

We have to be able to offer this as basically a domestic Palestinian interest. I believe that Palestinian citizens, if they were offered a way out, the situation will go back to what it was like in '96. When a father would bring his son, who may have thought about carrying out any operation, and would bring him, take him over to a security establishment of the Palestinians and would tell them, "please, stop him, arrest him. We don't want him to do that." ...I do hope that you trust us that we have the desire to move forward looking to the future. We do have the desire to bring both people away from hatred to working in cooperation and peace.

MR. PERRY: ...I tend to be less optimistic because, of course, and I am not an official spokesman of the Israeli government. ...A ceasefire means a stop to acts of terror against Israelis, and in order to stop them, some action has to be taken by the Palestinian Authority...but from 1996, there is not a sole action by any Palestinian organization, intelligence, police, whatever, and you have enough of them, that is trying to prevent terror.

And, we didn't ask, ... that the Palestinians be our proxy. Do it for yourself. If you'll do it for yourself, for your sake and for your people, we will be more than satisfied. We will be more than glad, and we will always be happy to help if you want our help, and if you don't need it, it's okay with us.... As soon as you will do it, things will be for sure much better, and Israel has to initiate all kinds of building measures of reconciliation, including settlements and other issues. But I am not going to go into this arena, and we are not going to provide or to ask for all kinds of promises, but as soon as you'll begin, I think things will go the right direction....

MR. DAHLAN: ...I believe that it is possible to reach an agreement to achieve a ceasefire. ...Mr. Perry [is] quite aware that when he says that we have not done anything since 1996, this is not fair and not true. I have declarations made by Israeli governments and Israeli officials and acknowledgments, official acknowledgments, by Israeli officials in official talk. I am talking after 1996, following the operation when Peres was there. We have adopted for three and a half years measures. If you don't see these things, what positive things do you want us to do that you can see?...

...For more than six months now, Palestinians do not have the freedom of movement. You speak about -- General Yahia who has been appointed as minister of interior, and he cannot leave his home, and the Israeli army invaded his home twice. You do not know. You're not aware of how serious the situation is... How can we do this over the phone? How can we call the suicide bomber in Ramallah and tell him, listen, stay in your home? Don't we need to be able to move as Palestinian forces and to have Palestinian security agents to follow people, to track them, to establish surveillance? Doesn't this require us to have jails so we can imprison those people, detain them?

MR. PERRY: ... You are sitting in a curfew because of what has happened, and don't bring me stories about you being unable to gather intelligence because you are under curfew. The curfew was called because... since 1996, nothing happened ....

MR. DAHLAN: You mentioned at the beginning that we could do something. However, please Mr. Perry, to deny the facts to the truth, this will not lead us to any solution. Successive Israeli governments, including Netanyahu's, acknowledged that we did a sizable security effort. You are looking at the situation from only one prism.

MR. INDYK: ...Are you saying that if the Israelis were to lift the curfew, the security services would act immediately in ways that they haven't been prepared to act up till now?

MR. DAHLAN: I can say for sure, but not I mean only the curfew. They should also withdraw their forces from the A area not more. We're not asking for any more than that, from area A.

MR. INDYK: And what is Israel supposed to do when another suicide attack occurs?

MR. DAHLAN: This is a kind of discussion that will not lead to any solution. Ninety-nine percent of the operations took place while closures were imposed. Eighty percent of the operations were taking place during the preventive measures that were adopted by Israel and following that, Operation Defensive Shield, and we have to really face the difficult situation here. We have to be able to move jointly. I believe that a withdrawal from region A will encourage Palestinians to fulfill the commitment and ... push the Palestinian Authority to carry out some important measures and to step-by-step build trust and reach stability. However, let us not forget that the political horizon is the final solution.

Q: ...Mr. Dahlan, your name is often referred to as one possible candidate to succeed Mr. Arafat. If the system were changed in a way that introduced a prime ministership, would you be prepared to engage in a political career? And to Mr. Perry, would the Israelis be prepared to accept a new Palestinian leadership from the old security apparatus?

MR. PERRY: ...Yes, Israel will receive any elected or appointed chairman, but it's really, and I'm not doing a democratic show, it's really an internal issue for the Palestinians, and they should decide to do it. I think that Israel will welcome a new appointment of a leader that will better the situation of his nation and of his people.

...You can, or everybody can blame Israel in whatever way he wants, but the demonstrations today, the crowds today are against the Authority, the Palestinian Authority, not against Israel. So, take into consideration and look at the pictures, but the answer...is positive.

MR. DAHLAN: ...I can say with all confidence that the situation or the issue for the American administration and Israel regarding Chairman Arafat is really very superficial if one looks at it their way. They are thinking about their position and the position of the U.S. administration as if there is no Palestinian people in the equation. It is a mistake to think with such a rationale. Maybe at one point or another, the popularity of Chairman Arafat went down, but when he's attacked by Israel and the United States, there's no question that his popularity increases. It's only in Jerusalem...that probably nine out ten people support Arafat now.

I don't believe that the problem is Mr. Arafat. Of course, that does not mean he is not responsible. I believe that everyone, everyone is at fault. Israel, the United States and the Authority. I believe that looking for an alternative leadership here is really wasting time. We must focus on our internal domestic reforms, and I feel a lot of responsiveness on behalf of President Arafat towards these efforts, especially on the financial issues and the security issues.

Today is the final day of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. Over the past several years, Israel has steadily integrated sustainable development into the policies of government ministries and public and private institutions. They have also worked with neighboring Arab countries to help facilitate sustainable development policies. The following are remarks delivered at the Summit by Majallie Whbee, Director General, Ministry of Regional Cooperation to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, on August 29, 2002. Additional information about Israel's involvement in the World Summit can be found at http://www.israel.org or http://www.johannesburgsummit.israel.org/mfm/web/main/missionhome.asp? MissionID=10998&.

Regional cooperation and sustainable development are intimately intertwined. Countries sharing common borders, invariably share common eco-systems. Cooperation and coordination are the only means by which synergies can be identified, negative externalities avoided and sustainability attained.

Unfortunately, sustainable development in the Middle East has historically been a victim of the protracted conflict. It scarred not only the landscape, but the livelihood of our peoples. Border areas, rather than evolving as cosmopolitan crossroads, became marginal outposts. We competed for scarce resources rather than pulling together to find solutions to common problems. Opportunities to rationalize water and land use management were ignored. National planning was conducted under the assumption that each country was an island onto itself. As a result, neither the environment nor the economy was allowed to flourish.

In a very real sense, sustainable development in the Middle East is predicated on regional cooperation, a goal to which Israel is deeply committed. The benefits of regional cooperation are far too great to ignore. In the case of environmental management, cooperation is essential for even the most basic level of co-existence. Through cooperation we can proactively build a better present while working towards a brighter future. The very process of conceiving, planning and implementing joint initiatives can help consolidate confidence in peace and propel regional capacity building forward.

Israel has concluded peace agreements with Jordan and Egypt. While attracting little attention, regional cooperation in agriculture, water, sewage management, earth science research, coral reef eco-systems, public health, oil spill prevention, Integrated Pest Management and other areas have made positive contributions towards sustainability. We look forward to deepening the process of regional cooperation in both bi-lateral and multi-lateral frameworks.

The situation with the Palestinian Authority is less encouraging and the problems more acute. The events of the past two years have not benefited either side and they have been detrimental to the cause of sustainable development. The time has come to reverse this process and build a positive dynamic.

Israel's Ministry of Regional Cooperation, of which I serve as Director-General, is entrusted with planning for "the day after." We firmly believe that, despite the vast political uncertainty, "the day after" can and should begin today. We together with the Palestinians can undertake projects involving social and economic cooperation that neither impact or compromise the national aspirations or security of either side. Projects for sustainable development rank high on the list of possible projects.

The time for action is now. Any number of projects can be launched that are not contingent on the outcome of either current internal developments in the Palestinian Authority or future bi or multilateral arrangements. Surely the process of planning can commence. We can create partnerships with and between NGOs and local authorities to set into motion a process of cooperation free of political implications.

The environment is one extremely vital sector in which this can be implemented relatively easily. For far too long the environmental projects have been held hostage by the fluctuations of the peace process. The time has come to put a stop to this, since there is so much at stake and the environment cannot wait.

Earlier this year, the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Water Committee, issued a call to keep the water infrastructure out of "the cycle of violence". We can go one step further by building and improving water infrastructure and by addressing problem areas that today compromise the quality of life for both Israelis and Palestinians.

We have identified key actions that can, and in some cases, are being taken to improve water quality in various locations throughout Israel and the PA.

• Palestinian towns can link themselves to Israeli built sewage systems to stem the flow of sewage into sources of fresh water and improve health conditions for all area residents.

• A plan to transfer fresh water from Israel to the Palestinian Authority through five separate pipelines can be implemented almost immediately. Implementation is contingent solely on the willingness of the PA to let it happen.

• A series of sewage purification plants can be constructed or upgraded in key Palestinian cities and towns to improve the quality of life both in the PA and in Israel.

• Another initiative is a project to clean up more than 30 streams throughout the West Bank. The proposed program involves cleaning primary and other channels near population centers to prevent pollution of drinking water, mosquito infestation and to enable better water and sanitation management on an on-going basis. The Ministry of Regional Cooperation has undertaken to finance this enterprise.

These are just a few examples of specific actions that can be implemented to improve environmental conditions for both Palestinian and Israeli residents. We are open to any proposal that may be forthcoming from our Palestinian colleagues, the donor community or from civil society groups.

For some projects, financing may be an obstacle, but one that can be overcome. For some, however, the primary obstacle to implementation is will. This can and should be overcome instantaneously. These initiatives do not create new political realities that will have to be undone sometime in the future. In stark contrast to the zero-sum game of diplomatic negotiations, they create a sum-plus opportunity that can lead to additional mutual benefits in the future.

New York, 17 September 2002

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell; Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov; Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller; High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten met in New York yesterday. Below is a summary of their meeting, as posted on the website of the Foreign Ministry of Israel - www.Israel.org.

Reaffirming their previous statements, the Quartet members reviewed developments since their last meeting, on July 16, 2002. They deplored and condemned the morally repugnant violence and terror, which must end. They agreed to intensify their efforts in support of their shared goal of achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement based on their common vision, as inter alia expressed by President Bush, of two states, Israel and an independent, viable and democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security.

The Quartet will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities to seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict based on UN Security Council resolutions 242, 338, and 1397, the Madrid terms of reference, the principle of land for peace, and implementation of all existing agreements between the parties. The Quartet reaffirms the continuing importance of the initiative of Saudi Arabia, endorsed at the Arab League Beirut Summit, which is a vital part of the foundation of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.

The Quartet is working closely with the parties and consulting key regional actors on a concrete, three-phase implementation roadmap that could achieve a final settlement within three years. Comprehensive security performance is essential. The plan will not succeed unless it addresses political, economic, humanitarian, and institutional dimensions and should spell out reciprocal steps to be taken by the parties in each of its phases. In this approach, progress between the three phases would be strictly based on the parties' compliance with specific performance benchmarks to be monitored and assessed by the Quartet.

The Quartet also supports, in preparation for establishment of a Palestinian state, efforts by the Palestinians to develop a constitution which ensures separation of power, transparency, accountability, and the vibrant political system which Palestinians deserve.

The plan will contain in its initial phase (2002-first half of 2003) performance-based criteria for comprehensive security reform, Israeli withdrawals to their positions of September 28, 2000 as the security situation improves, and support for the Palestinians' holding of free, fair, and credible elections early in 2003, based on recommendations established by the Quartet's International Task Force on Palestinian Reform. The first phase should include a ministerial-level meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) to review the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza and identify priority areas for donor assistance, including to the reform process, before the end of the year. The Quartet Principals will meet alongside the AHLC ministerial.

>In the plan's second phase (2003), our efforts should focus on the option of creating a Palestinian state with provisional borders based upon a new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement.

In its final phase (2004-5), the plan envisages Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status solution in 2005. Consistent with the vision expressed by President Bush, this means that the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties and based on U.N. resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized borders.

The Quartet welcomes the Task Force's report on the progress of the seven Reform Support Groups, and notes that a number of significant achievements, especially in the area of financial reform, have been realized in a short period of time under very difficult circumstances. Under the aegis of the Quartet, the Task Force will continue its work of supporting the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority as they establish and prioritize reform benchmarks, particularly on the issues of elections, judicial reform, and the role of civil society.

Both the reform effort and the political process must include Israeli measures, consistent with Israel's legitimate security concerns, to improve the lives of Palestinians, including allowing the resumption of normal economic activity, facilitating the movement of goods, people, and essential services and to lift curfew and closures. Consistent with transparent and accountable Palestinian budget arrangements, the Quartet welcomes Israel's decision to transfer part of the Palestinian VAT and customs revenue that has been withheld since September 2000, and calls on Israel to continue this process and reestablish regular monthly revenue transfers to the Palestinian Ministry of Finance. And consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Commission, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop.

The Quartet welcomes the report of UN Secretary-General's Personal Humanitarian Envoy Catherine Bertini as well as the latest UNSCO report on the impact of closures. It calls on Israel and the Palestinians to recognize and act upon their respective responsibilities and to move quickly to ameliorate the sharply deteriorating humanitarian situation in the West Bank and Gaza. In particular, Israel must ensure full, safe and unfettered access for international and humanitarian personnel.

Reiterating the critical importance of restoring lasting calm through comprehensive performance on security, the Quartet calls on the Palestinians to work with the U.S. and regional partners to reform the Palestinian security services, strengthen policing and law and order for the civilian population, and fight the terror that has severely undermined the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians. Israelis and Palestinians should reestablish security cooperation and reciprocal steps should be taken by Israel as the Palestinians work to combat terrorism in all its forms.

The Quartet will continue to discuss the timing and modalities of an international conference.

The Quartet also met and discussed these issues with the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, as representatives of the Arab League Follow-up Committee, and with representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Quartet looks forward to continuing consultations.

From September 21 to 25, 2002, the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, "established in 1988 by a group of Palestinian journalists and researchers to provide information on events in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip," conducted a poll of Palestinian attitudes towards the current situation and the Intifada. Following are excerpts of the reported results. Additional information about JMCC and the poll can be found at www.jmcc.org.

42.6% of Palestinians are optimistic or very optimistic about the future. 56.8% are pessimistic of very pessimistic.

46.5% support peace negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel.

23.8% are optimistic that there will be a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

28.5% support the Oslo agreement, while 66.3% oppose it.

39% agree that peace will eventually be achieved between the Palestinians and Israel. 53.3% disagree.

38.9% believe the peace process is dead and there is no chance of resuming negotiations.

44.5% believe the peace process is passing through difficult conditions and has an unclear future.

12.7% believe the peace process is still alive and there is a possibility of resuming negotiations.

80.6% support or strongly support the continuation of the al-Aqsa Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

19.4% favor the continuation of a popular resistance Intifada; 11.5% favor military resistance. 59.5% favor both military and popular resistance.

52% of Palestinians believe that the continuation of the Intifada together with negotiations is the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals. 31.9% believe the Intifada is the best method, and 11.3% believe negotiations are best for achieving their goals.

48.4% of Palestinians say that the end result of the Intifada should be the end of "the occupation on the basis of UN Resolution 242 and establishing a Palestinian state." 43% believe the end result should be "liberating all of historic Palestine".

47.8% are optimistic that the Intifada will achieve its objective (as they characterized it in a previous question), while 44.4% are pessimistic.

44% believe a "two-state formula" is the best solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 28.9% believe a "Bi-National State" (where Palestinians and Israelis "enjoy equal rights") is the best solution.

8.3% believe the best solution is a Palestinian State, and 2.1% believe an Islamic Palestinian State is best.

69.5% feel that the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets is a suitable response within the current political conditions, while 23.2% find it harmful to Palestinian national interests.

20.5% of Palestinians believe military operations should be resumed only inside Israel; 12.2% only within the West Bank and Gaza; and 46.1% believe military operations should be resumed inside Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. 16.3% answered that they are not for the resumption of military operations.

64.3% support suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians, while 27.7% oppose.

20.5% responded that they support ceasing all kind of operations inside Israel; 61.1% do not.

65.2% are in favor of presidential elections in January 2003; 25.5% oppose.

73.2% support Legislative Council Elections in January 2003; 18.4% oppose.

60.6% expect that Yasser Arafat will be re-elected in free democratic elections.

42.5% think there is a need for a Prime Minister position in the Palestinian National Authority.

43.3% evaluate the performance of the Palestinian National Authority as good, while 52% consider it bad.

9.7% evaluate the Legislative Council's performance as good; 47.8% consider it bad.

40.9% are satisfied or somewhat satisfied with how Arafat manages his position as Palestinian Authority President. 14.9% are very dissatisfied.

12.8% believe Arafat is in control of the internal Palestinian situation.

39.4% believe Arafat is in control to a degree. 27.2% believe he is not in control to a degree. 18% believe Arafat is not in control at all.

On September 30, 2002, Amnesty International released a report entitled "Israel and the Occupied Territories and the Palestinian Authority Killing the Future: Children in the Line of Fire." The report, which can be found at http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/pages/IOT_reports, states that since the beginning of the intifada, "Palestinian and Israeli children have been targeted in an unprecedented manner. In the period from 29 September 2000 to the end of August 2002, some 1700 Palestinians, including more than 250 children were killed, and more than 580 Israelis, most of them civilians and including 72 children, were killed."

The report concludes, "The cases presented in this report are only a sample of the hundreds of documented cases of killings of Palestinian children by the IDF and of Israeli children killed by Palestinian armed groups. They illustrate a pattern of increasing disregard by all the parties involved in the conflict for the right to life of the most vulnerable members of the Israeli and Palestinian civilian population. Respect for human life must be restored. Only a new mindset among Israelis and Palestinians can prevent the killing of more children -- a mindset that values each child's life, whereby all those involved in the conflict behave according to the fundamental principles of humanity enshrined in international law."

The report is extremely critical of Israel, and specifically, of the Israeli Defense Forces, however, it is also critical of Palestinian justifications for terrorist attacks, stating, "The assertion made by Palestinian armed groups that international law imposes no constraints on the means used to fight occupying powers runs counter to one of the most basic rules of international humanitarian law....no violations by the Israeli army, no matter their scale or gravity, can ever justify the targeting and killing of Israeli children or any other civilians by Palestinian groups." The report was also critical of the Palestinian Authority for failing to prevent terrorist attacks, and for failing to "bring those responsible to justice according to international standards for fair trials."

IDF RESPONSE

In response to the report's allegations, the IDF released the following statement last week: ( http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0mge0)

"For the past two years, the IDF has been engaged in difficult and intensive fighting against Palestinian terrorist factions. During this period of fighting, which was imposed upon the State of Israel and the IDF, Palestinian terrorist factions perpetrated over 14,500 terror attacks, claiming the lives of 624 Israelis.

All IDF operations adhere to international humanitarian law, in strict compliance with the highest moral and legal standards. In glaring contrast, Palestinian terrorist factions defy all norms, be they moral or legal, deliberately attacking civilians only because they are Israeli, as described at length in the report. Amnesty International has labeled the Palestinian suicide attacks as crimes against humanity.

As part of its adherence to the rules of the conduct of war, the IDF goes to great lengths to avoid harming civilians, especially children. This concern is an integral part of soldier training, of the regulations governing when to open fire, of orders issued by commanders, of operational plans, and of the message conveyed by the highest-ranking officers.

Regrettably, some civilians, including children, have been injured during the fighting against the Palestinian terrorist groups. In no case were these injuries intentional. Those hurt were either individuals involved in Palestinian terrorist activity, or civilians who were unintentionally hurt when they entered a live-fire zone.

The Palestinian terrorists are solely and unequivocally responsible for the injuries caused to Palestinian children. Since the beginning of the conflict two years ago, the Palestinian terrorist factions have cynically exploited children in terrorist activity, in violation of international law. Children are groomed and dispatched to carry out suicide attacks in the centers of the Israeli civilian population; positioned at the front lines of demonstrations to hide snipers behind them; and used to plant explosives and deliver weapons. Moreover, the terrorist factions have transformed Palestinian civilian population centers into terrorist activity headquarters.

One must keep in mind that the Palestinian society and several international organizations have denounced the abuse of children by Palestinian terrorist factions. For one, the UN Secretary General condemned the phenomenon in his report of Operation Defensive Shield. It must be mentioned that the Palestinians publicly acknowledged that terrorist organizations paid Rafah Palestinian children 5 NIS (roughly equal to $1 each) to thrust explosive charges towards IDF soldiers. Forty of those children were injured and became amputees (Al-Rai newspaper, 20 June 2002). Unfortunately, the UN report does not mention this particularly abominable Palestinian practice. Those who use children to perpetrate terror attacks and those who use houses where children reside to coordinate and perpetrate attacks are responsible for these children's' injuries.

Authors of the Amnesty report compare IDF operations in which Palestinian children were killed to Palestinian terror attacks in which Israeli children were killed. This comparison is unjustified and baseless. Palestinian terror attacks, especially suicide bombings, are designed to cause the death of Israeli civilians, including children. This is ruthless, unprecedented, inhuman terror. On the other hand, IDF activity is conducted in accordance with the laws of war and is not aimed at injuring civilians. Injuries are occasionally sustained only because Palestinian terrorists act from within Palestinian civilian population centers. Hence, equating the two sides is baseless, and indicates a fundamental lack of fairness amongst authors of the report.

The authors falsely claim the IDF does not investigate incidents in which Palestinian children are injured, and grants immunity to the soldiers involved. The fact is that IDF commanders do investigate incidents in which Palestinian civilians were injured. When suspicion of criminal misbehavior by soldiers arises, the Military Police launches an inquiry. Since September 2000, the beginning of operation Ebb and Flow, over 220 inquiries have been launched by the Military Police, including incidents in which Palestinian minors were injured. As examples, the Military Police launched inquiries regarding the following incidents: the death of Palestinian children near Khan Yunis on 22 November 2001; the death of Yasser Kassabi from Kalandia on 8 December 2001; the death of Muhamad Hassan Altalalaka near Beit Hanoun on 1 March 2002; the death of children in Jenin on 21 June 2002; as well as many other incidents. The claims that incidents are not investigated and soldiers enjoy immunity are false. The fact that the IDF investigates and establishes commissions of inquiry, even while in the midst of intense fighting, is part of its identity as a professional army.

The IDF is dedicated to upholding "purity of arms" and preserving human dignity, and regrets any injuries to innocent children. The IDF emphasizes that the cynical use of Palestinian children by Palestinian terrorist factions is the main cause of their injuries. The IDF applauds the report's implicit condemnation of Palestinian terror attacks against the Israeli civilian population.

More than 1000 supporters of Israel attended rallies at the University of Michigan to counter a Palestinian solidarity conference that took place on the campus over the weekend. Students from more than a dozen colleges and universities nationwide came to speak out against the conference. The following is a thoughtful analysis of the issues at the conference by University of Michigan Professor Zvi Gitelman.

The Mission Statement of the Second National Student Conference on the Palestine Solidarity Movement calls for "an end to the Israeli system of Apartheid and discrimination against the indigenous Palestinian population." The State of Israel, the only Jewish state in the world, is nonetheless a multi-national, multi-religious and multi-racial state and is the only democratic polity in the entire Middle East. Yet, it is accused of "Apartheid" and "discrimination." Such accusations are not leveled against those Jeffersonian democracies such as Saudi Arabia, which permits no Christian or Jewish religious services on its soil, restricts the rights and movements of women, and allows no citizenship by naturalization. Not against Syria, the fiefdom of the al-Asads who slaughtered 10,000 people they did not like in the city of Homs; where the ubiquitous secret police make any political conversation highly dangerous; and where Jews were segregated and persecuted until most were allowed to leave a few years ago. Not against Iraq, whose Kurdish and Shi'ite populations have been gassed and poisoned (not by the American military) but by that paragon of democratic leadership, Sadaam Hussein. Nor against Egypt where Coptic Christians and "infidel" foreigners have been murdered by Islamists, where academics have been jailed for daring to question aspects of the regime. Not against Jordan which killed more Palestinians in a single month (September 1970) than Israel has between 1948 and the present. It's not even worth mentioning Qaddafi's Libya, or the Sudan. Not a single Arab state is a democracy and most systematically discriminate against whatever racial, religious and ethnic minorities are still there.

But let us scrutinize Israel, as the "Student Conference on the Palestine Solidarity Movement" claims it will do. "Apartheid" is not simply a nasty word to be thrown at people you don't like. It has a specific meaning. It means state regulations that institutionalize by force a system of segregation and discrimination, as instituted in South Africa in 1948. In Israel, Arab and Jewish Israelis live mostly apart, attend different schools, and do not mix socially. But this is largely by their choice, as each group seeks to preserve its distinct culture. No doubt, there is also some element of mutual hostility here, but if, say, Mexico had been attacking the United States for 53 years - as her Arab neighbors have been doing to Israel - do you think Mexican-Americans and other Americans would be embracing each other? When Japan attacked the United States in 1941, the American government interned thousands of people just because they were of Japanese origin. Israel has done nothing of the sort with its over 900,000 Arab citizens, who constitute about 20 percent of the population and who, unlike blacks in South Africa, enjoy full legal and civil rights. "Apartheid?" Balderdash!

Is Israel "racist?" Racism is promoting and defending the interests of one race to the exclusion of others. Israel's citizenry includes 900,000 Arabs, about 100,000 Ethiopians and other "peoples of color." It includes at least a quarter of a million non-Jews who have come from the former Soviet Union, and thousands of Christians from many countries, a small group of Vietnamese boat people, Druze, Circassians and others. Among the Jews themselves several races are to be found, as any casual passerby on an Israeli street can immediately see.

Ironically, our idealistic colleagues so hell-bent on righting Israel's wrongs and condemning her for human rights violations are attacking the one state where more Arabs have the right to vote in free and fair elections than in any other state in the Middle East and perhaps the world. In 1999, 75 percent of the 429,000 Arabs in the electorate voted, a bit down from previous years but about twice the turnout of the American electorate in its presidential elections (you know, the elections in which the guy who gets the most votes loses). About 28 percent of them voted for predominantly Jewish parties!

As Alan Dershowitz points out (Harvard Crimson, September 23, 2002), "Israel has the only independent judiciary in the entire Middle East. Its Supreme Court ... is the only court in the Middle East from which an Arab or a Muslim can expect justice, as many have found in winning dozens of victories against the Israeli government, the Israeli military and individual Israeli citizens. I challenge the proponents of divestment to name a court in any Arab or Muslim country that is comparable to the Israeli Supreme Court - Israel is the only country in the region that has virtually unlimited freedom of speech. Any person in Israel, whether Jewish, Muslim or Christian, can criticize the Israeli government and its leaders. No citizen of any other Middle Eastern or Muslim state can do that without fear of imprisonment or death. Israel is the only country that has openly confronted the difficult issue of protecting the civil liberties of the ticking bomb terrorist. The Israeli Supreme Court recently ruled that despite the potential benefits of employing non-lethal torture to extract information, the tactic is illegal. Brutal torture, including lethal torture, is commonplace in nearly every other Middle Eastern and Muslim country. Nor is Israel the only country that is occupying lands claimed by others. China, Russia, Turkey, Iraq, Spain, France and numerous other countries control not only land, but people who seek independence. Indeed, among these countries Israel is the only one that has offered statehood, first in 1948 when the Palestinians rejected the U.N. partition that would have given them a large, independent state and chose instead to invade Israel. Again in the year 2000 Palestinians were offered a state, rejected it and employed terrorism.

Like all other democracies, Israel is an incomplete and imperfect one. Was the United States a democracy in 1918? Yes, even though over half the population, women and many Americans of African descent, did not have the right to vote. Israeli Arabs have legal, but not social equality. The educational, medical and other facilities that serve the Arab population are not as good as those in the Jewish sector. Only after more than half a century was the first Arab appointed a minister in the Israeli government. Both Arabs and Jews must do much more to overcome what is probably growing Arab alienation from the state, and surely that will be done if and when the main barrier to better relations, the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, will be resolved.

As to the Arabs living in the territories, they have been given golden opportunities to establish their own state alongside Israel. Their putative leadership has betrayed them time and again. Some of their religious and political leaders persist in the strategy of "all or nothing at all": We must wipe out the Jewish state and its Jews entirely and establish our own state on its ruins. Since 1921 this strategy has led to nothing at all, except misery, poverty, frustration, hatred, killing - and not of Arabs alone. Clearly, there are difficult issues to be resolved in Israel and the Palestinian Authority. These include the future of the settlements, the establishment of democratic and non-corrupt Palestinian self-governance, the prevention of terrorism, and the achievement of greater de facto equality by Israel's Arab citizens.

Alan Dershowitz has proposed an alternative for divestment for his university: "Let Harvard choose nations for investment in the order of the human rights records. If that were done, investment in Israel would increase dramatically, while investments in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Philippines, Indonesia, the Palestinian Authority and most other countries of the world would decrease markedly." Regents of the University of Michigan, organizers of the conference, are you listening?

Gitelman is a professor of political science and the Preston Tisch Professor of Judaic Studies.

Source: The Michigan Daily, October 17, 2002

Today in Israel, last minute efforts to find a compromise between Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the Labor Party over the budget broke down with all 24 of Labor's ministers, including its chairman, Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, submitting their letters of resignation to Sharon. Their resignations are set to become effective Friday night. Despite Labor’s opposition, the 2003 state budget was passed on first reading by the Knesset Wednesday night by a large majority. Two more readings however, are required after the initial vote to approve the budget - a process that is likely to create more coalition tensions in coming weeks. It is not clear at this point what the political outcome will be for Israel. Early elections are one of a number of possibilities.

HEZBOLLAH

In the October 21 and the October 28 issues of the New Yorker, Jeffrey Goldberg provided a careful examination of the group that may be the world's most dangerous terrorist organization, Hezbollah, or "Party of God". Goldberg's description of the ideology and the goals of this group is important for an understanding of the situation in the Middle East. When participants in the JCPA Leadership Mission to Israel met with officials in Israel recently, they were told that one of Israel’s primary present concerns is the situation on their Northern border. Following are excerpts from an online interview with Jeffrey Goldberg:

What is Hezbollah? Who are its members?

JEFFREY GOLDBERG: Hezbollah is a radical Lebanese Shiite movement, headquartered in Beirut, and backed by the governments of Iran and Syria. It is a political party—it has eleven seats in the Lebanese parliament—and it is a social-service group that runs hospitals and orphanages and the like throughout Lebanon. It is a movement, one expert said, that operates on four tracks simultaneously: the political, the social, the guerrilla, and the terrorist. >From the perspective of the American government, though, Hezbollah's political activities and charity work are irrelevant; it is the terrorism that interests the American government. American officials consider Hezbollah to be one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the world, one that has killed, over the past twenty years, more than three hundred Americans.

In your article, you describe Hezbollah as "the most successful terrorist organization in modern history." Do you mean that it is successful in the narrow sense of having pulled off acts of public violence, or in the achievement of certain political ends?  Unlike Al Qaeda, for instance, Hezbollah has succeeded, on two notable occasions, in achieving policy goals through the application of terrorist techniques. First, it drove American and French peacekeepers from Lebanon in the early nineteen-eighties, after a series of deadly bombings. (In one, two hundred and forty-one U.S. marines were murdered.) And two years ago, through guerrilla warfare and terrorism, it forced the Israeli Army to pull out from Israel's so-called security zone in southern Lebanon.

Does Hezbollah have a final goal, a point at which it would be satisfied? For example, certain groups in Ireland want all the Irish counties to be united.

Hezbollah is more ambitious than that. It wants to create in Lebanon an Islamic republic in the style of Iran; it wants to destroy Israel; and it wants to unite the Islamic world under its banner. The word "Hezbollah" means "Party of God," and its leaders do not think of their membership as Shiite alone. All righteous Muslims, in their formulation, are members of the Party of God.

Hezbollah is based in Lebanon, and yet it seems beyond the control of the Lebanese government—if it can even be called a government. Who controls Lebanon? And is there any state that can be said to control Hezbollah?

The short answer to both questions is Syria. Syria is the power broker in Lebanon; it has occupied the country since the end of the civil war, and it is Hezbollah's patron. Syria's patronage, in fact, explains why Hezbollah was the only militia not forced to disarm when Lebanon was reunified. There is, of course, a government in Lebanon, split up among the country's many confessional groups—Christians, Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and Druze, mainly. But national-security decisions are in the hands of the Syrians. That said, Hezbollah receives support, inspiration, financial aid, and weapons from Iran. It is not clear, though, if Hezbollah is completely controlled by Iran and Syria, or if it has the capacity and the will to act on its own.

One interesting question you explore is where, in the rhetoric and ideology of Hezbollah, hatred of Israel ends and frank anti-Semitism begins. Can you discuss this distinction? How unusual is Hezbollah in this respect? And how dangerous is it?

To most Israelis, and, indeed, to most Jews, the belief that Israel should be destroyed is itself a kind of anti-Semitism. In other words, the argument approaches anti-Semitism when it goes beyond, say, the rights and wrongs of Israeli policy with regard to the West Bank and Gaza, and becomes a question of whether the Jews constitute a nation that deserves a state at all. That said, something new is happening in the Arab world—namely, the melding of Arab nationalist-based anti-Zionism, anti-Jewish rhetoric from the Koran, and, most disturbingly, the antique anti-Semitic beliefs and conspiracy theories of European Fascism. Add Holocaust denial, which is also becoming popular in the Arab world, and you have a dangerous new ideology, an ideology that Hezbollah, despite its assertions that it has nothing against Jews as Jews, propounds quite vigorously.

There is some concern that the first act of a military conflict between Iraq and the United States might involve Hezbollah firing missiles into Israel. How real is this threat? Do you see a war between the U.S. and Iraq turning into a regional war?

The short answer is that anything is possible. The threat is real; the only question is whether American pressure on Hezbollah's sponsor, Syria, can keep Hezbollah from opening up a campaign to spark an Arab-Israeli war. Such a war would, among other things, divert the world's attention and hamstring the Bush Administration's effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

Why, in reporting on a Lebanese terrorist group, did you travel to Paraguay? And what did you find there?

Hezbollah, like other Middle Eastern terrorist groups, has sympathizers, financiers, and even terror operatives spread out across the globe. One of the places that Hezbollah is strongest is in the area of South America known as the Triple Frontier, or Tri-Border area, where Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil meet. Law enforcement is lax, which, of course, is attractive to terrorists, and there is a large Arab community in Paraguay and Brazil in which to hide. What I found in the Triple Frontier was a very complex and lucrative funding network for Hezbollah, as well as proof that Hezbollah maintained training camps in the area. I also found that two of the worst terrorist attacks in South American history—the attacks in Buenos Aires on the Israeli Embassy and on a Jewish community center—may have been planned in the Triple Frontier.

You describe shakedowns of businesses in Arab immigrant communities in South America. How important are these? Where does Hezbollah get its money, and how does it move it from country to country?

Hezbollah is the best example in the world today of a state-sponsored terror group; it receives most of its budget from the government of Iran, something in the range of a hundred million dollars each year. But it takes in more money than that from its criminal operations, from its fund-raising activities, and from shakedowns of legitimate, or nonaffiliated, Middle Eastern businessmen. This is what happens in the Triple Frontier. Law-enforcement officials I spoke to in the region told me that Hezbollah took in twelve million dollars in the year 2000. It moves its money in much the same way that drug cartels move their money: by washing it through legitimate businesses, and by moving it through shell companies and offshore bank accounts.

Failing to form a narrow coalition government in the wake of Labor’s walkout last week, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon informed President Moshe Katzav yesterday, that he was unable to maintain a majority in the Knesset. The dissolution of the 15th Knesset was announced shortly thereafter. Today the Israeli paper Ha’aretz reported that elections to Israel’s 16th Knesset are tentatively scheduled for January 28, 2003.

What Does this Mean for the Future of the Knesset?

Upon Sharon’s decision to call for early elections, former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation to join the government. He was sworn in today as Israel’s Foreign Minister. He is also expected to run against Sharon in the Likud primary, which will take place approximately three weeks from today.

The primary in the Labor Party will be held, as planned, on November 19. Running for leader of the Labor party are former Defense Minister and incumbent party chairman, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, MK Haim Ramon, and Haifa Mayor Amram Mitzna. According to a recent poll amongst Labor party members, Mitzna is leading with 43 percent, followed by Ben-Eliezer with 25 percent, and Ramon trailing with 18 percent. If none of the three candidates gets 40 percent of the vote, a run-off will be held on December 3.

About one week after the primaries for the party leadership in both the Likud and Labor, the remainder of the party's candidates for the Knesset will be chosen. In the Likud, the central committee of 2,750 people will elect the prospective MKs. In Labor, there is still discussion about the system to be employed in electing the members of the Knesset list. According to Ha’aretz, there are those who prefer not to hold primaries and to give the job over to a committee but many of the senior party members are opposed to this. The issue will be determined after the election of the party's leader.

What is the Status of the Current Knesset?

Israel's last general election was held in 1999. Under a system that has since been scrapped, Sharon was elected in a separate prime ministerial ballot in February 2001. Once parliament is dissolved, Sharon's administration becomes a transition government that no member can quit until after Election Day, and that cannot be taken down by a vote of no confidence.

How do Knesset Elections Work?

Knesset elections are based on a vote for a party rather than for individuals -- under Israel's parliamentary system, each voter selects a party, not a candidate, in casting a ballot. 120 Knesset seats are assigned in proportion to each party's percentage of the total national vote. However, the minimum required for a party to win a Knesset seat is 1.5 percent of the total votes cast. After the election, Israel's President will select one member of the Parliament — most likely the leader of the party with the most seats — to form a new government and serve as Prime Minister.

Knesset seats are assigned in proportion to each party's percentage of the total national vote. A party's surplus votes, which are insufficient for an additional seat, are redistributed among the various parties according to their proportional size resulting from the elections, or as agreed between parties prior to the election.

The number and order of members entering the new Knesset for each party corresponds to its list of candidates as presented for election. Should an MK resign or pass away in the course of the Knesset term, the next person on that party's list automatically replaces him/her.

To date, all governments have been based on coalitions of several parties, since no party has received enough Knesset seats to be able to form a government by itself.

By Robert Satloff, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

On Tuesday, November 12, 2002, the US administration acquiesced to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's request to freeze its "road map" for a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict until after the elections and the formation of a new government in Israel. Meanwhile, on Monday, American envoy David Satterfield met in Jerusalem with representatives of the Quartet for talks on finalization of the road map. Diplomatic sources said the updated version of the road map is different and far more detailed than the original draft. After hearing the reservations of the Israelis, the Palestinians and the other members of the Quartet, the Americans decided to tighten up security demands on the Palestinians and called for Israel to freeze settlement activity.

The following is an analysis of the original "Road Map" plan, a forty-three-point document titled "Elements of a Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," which was reportedly handed to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon when he met with President Bush in October. The document, the product of intensive consultation between the four members of the Middle East peace process Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations), offers the most ambitious and detailed plan yet to restart Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking after more than two years of terror and violence. The entire text of the analysis can be found at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/.

Brief Outline of the Roadmap

The roadmap envisions three "phases" of activity: Transformation/Elections (October 2002-May 2003), Transition (June 2003-December 2003), and Statehood (2004-2005).

The first phase is itself broken into two stages: October-December 2002 and January-May 2003. During the first stage, it is envisioned that Palestinians prepare the legal basis for elections, draft a new constitution "for statehood," and begin retraining and rebuilding their security forces.

Palestinians are asked to take three steps toward Israel: issue an "unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate end to the armed Intifada and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere"; end all incitement; and "begin phased resumption of security cooperation as agreed in the Tenet work plan." At the same time, Israel is asked to facilitate Palestinian Authority official travel "without restriction"; transfer tax revenue; lift curfews and ease travel between Palestinian areas; dismantle settlement outposts erected since the start of the Sharon government; and end actions "that undermine trust," including attacks in civilian areas and deportations (what the roadmap calls "punitive measures").

Meanwhile, Arab states will "move decisively" to cut off funding of extremist groups. During the second stage, "as comprehensive security performance moves forward" and Palestinians meet "agreed judicial, administrative and economic benchmarks," it is envisioned that Israel "freeze all settlement activity," reopen closed Palestinian economic institutions in "East Jerusalem," and withdraw its forces progressively to pre-intifada positions, enabling Palestinian legislative elections to be held. At the close of this phase, Egypt and Jordan would return their ambassadors to Israel.

The second phase (Transition) starts after Palestinian elections and ends with the "possible creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders. "During this phase, the Quartet would convene an "international conference" to launch negotiations on "the possibility" of such a state. Inside the territories, Palestinians would approve a new constitution and take important security measures. For its part, Israel is envisioned as completing, with Palestinians, negotiations for the "creation of a state with provisional borders," as well as taking unspecified "further action" on Jewish settlements "simultaneous" with the establishment of the Palestinian state (implying that the provisional borders would not be limited to the current boundaries of Areas A and B).

The third phase (Statehood) opens with a second "international conference "to endorse the agreement on Palestinian statehood with provisional borders and launch "final status negotiations" to reach a permanent settlement in 2005. Should that be attained, the roadmap envisions "Arab state acceptance of normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region."

Silence on Arafat

The roadmap makes no mention of Yasir Arafat or, as President George W. Bush called for, "new" Palestinian leadership. However, in numerous clauses in which it refers to actions by the Palestinian Authority, the roadmap effectively relies on Arafat's participation and support....

Inching toward an Imposed Peace?

Although the roadmap reaffirms the concept of "negotiations between the parties," many of its proposals and the context in which they are presented collectively chip away at that very idea. The convening of two international conferences, the proposition that "judgments" of progress will be determined by the Quartet, and the creation of a "permanent" monitoring mechanism suggest the not-so-creeping internationalization of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. The implication of the detailed timeline offered within this roadmap is that the peacemaking engine can be expected to have gathered so much speed by 2004 that neither Israelis nor Palestinians will be in a position to stop the international locomotive pushing for a final agreement.

International Supervision

On the positive side, the roadmap repeatedly injects the idea of “performance-based” peacemaking, suggesting that actions, not timetables, will determine movement from one phase to another....On the one hand, the roadmap envisions progressively more extensive and intrusive monitoring and an ever-growing role in this bilateral conflict for international actors.  This vision is exemplified by the astonishing proposal for a "permanent" mechanism, suggesting an international presence assessing Israeli and Palestinian behavior in perpetuity.

On the other hand, however, the roadmap has strange gaps built into the monitoring process. By the time Palestinians are supposed to end incitement, for example, no supervisory mechanism is yet in place to monitor compliance. Moreover, no outside role is envisioned for determining whether the Palestinian constitution comports with agreements with Israel or for overseeing the work of the proposed Palestinian election commission. The roadmap offers no view as to what constitutes compliance, nor does it prioritize which requirements are deal-breakers....

Sequencing

The roadmap also runs counter to the thrust of President Bush's "security first" approach (outlined in his June 24, 2002, speech), which envisions an end to terror and violence as a precondition to further diplomatic engagement. But whereas previous Quartet statements suggested simultaneity in calling for Israeli and Palestinian steps toward peacemaking, the sequencing in the roadmap actually suggests a series of substantive and irreversible Israeli steps in advance of complementary Palestinian steps.

For example, in the stage that Palestinians are asked to "reiterate" (i.e., repeat their previous commitment regarding) Israel's right to exist and end incitement (though without monitoring), Israel is asked to accept numerous restrictions on its security operations in the territories, to transfer tax monies, and to dismantle settlement outposts....

Conclusion

As a springboard for new and intensive peacemaking efforts, the roadmap has numerous flaws. It is unclear, however, whether the document actually represents an evolving U.S. view toward pursuing the peace process after the coming confrontation with Iraq, or whether it has been tabled only as a temporary expedient to allay Arab and European concerns in advance of war in the Gulf. Even if the roadmap is only a device to deflect these concerns, such initiatives often have a way of taking on a life of their own. Breathing further life into this approach, without a top-to-bottom revision of both concept and detail, would render President Bush's June 24 approach stillborn.