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JCRC Middle East Briefings

Below is an analysis (emphasis added) by David Makovsky, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy http://www.washingtoninstitute.org from May 2, 2002 that discusses the shift in President Bush's agenda due to Saudi pressure and possible future steps toward a Middle East peace conference.

A spate of visitors have been coming to the United States to talk with senior Bush administration officials about the Middle East. Perhaps the most prominent visitor has been Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto Saudi ruler who last visited the United States three years ago. As a special gesture, President George W. Bush hosted Crown Prince Abdullah at his Crawford, Texas, ranch last week. Other recent visitors to see President Bush include Egypt's president Hosni Mubarak, Morocco's King Mohammed, and Lebanon's prime minister Rafik Hariri. [Last] week, President Bush...host[ed] Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon and, shortly thereafter, Jordan's King Abdullah. [On May 2], the State Department...host[ed] senior diplomats who deal with the Middle East, hailing from the European Union, Russia, and the UN. These countries and organizations have been consulting with each other and with the United States more than in previous times.

As President Bush meets with these leaders and considers his options, there is already a noticeable change in the Bush administration's Middle East public focus away from a virtually exclusive September 11 counter terrorism agenda. From President Bush's speech to Congress last September and the State of the Union speech in January, the animating principle of this administration has been the war on terrorism. The violence in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, though, coupled with the Saudi peace initiative spearheaded by Crown Prince Abdullah at the Arab summit in Beirut six weeks ago, has succeeded in shifting President Bush's agenda.

Saudis Change the Agenda

In the wake of September 11, there was much U.S. focus on the fact that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers came from Saudi Arabia. The spotlight consequently moved onto Saudi funding of Islamist extremists and anti-American madrasas, and anti-American hate material in the Saudi school curriculum and government-owned media. Yet, there is no evidence that these issues figured prominently, if at all, in the Crawford talks. To the contrary, Crown Prince Abdullah seems to have been successful in turning the tables, making the Arab-Israel arena the exclusive focus of his talks. Judging from reports, Abdullah made his very presence in Crawford a major concession in itself and insisted on being repaid in Arab-Israeli coinage. It is exceedingly hard to view Yasir Arafat's release from Ramallah yesterday, regardless of its merits, as anything short of an outcome driven by Saudi threats to distance itself from Washington. Denials notwithstanding, it appears that Abdullah repeated his threats from last August at the talks, implying the Saudis could disrupt oil flows or embrace Saddam Hussein. This threat-driven approach has been successful for Riyadh. As the Washington Post reported on February 10, Crown Prince Abdullah threatened President Bush last August, saying, "You go your way, I go my way. From now on, we will protect our national interests, regardless of where America's interests lie in the region." This prompted the National Security Council in the beginning of September to ask President Bush to give a speech supporting a vision for a Palestinian state at the UN later that month, and to plan a meeting with Arafat at that time. The planned meeting with Arafat was aborted because of September 11, but President Bush did give the speech.

The subsequent release of Arafat after the Crawford meeting demonstrates the effectiveness of Saudi muscle. It raises the question of whether this pattern will be followed to the conclusion the Saudis proposed in their March Beirut initiative -- namely, an imposed solution based on the 1967 ceasefire lines. The Saudi ability to drive this idea is no longer as fanciful as it may have seemed in the past. Saudi success to date in influencing the Bush administration is the first of four reasons that such an approach cannot be dismissed out of hand.

Second, the Saudis and other Arabs seem successful in persuading President Bush that continued tension in the Arab-Israeli arena would doom a central foreign policy goal of the Bush administration -- i.e., toppling Saddam Hussein.

Third, according to reports, Crown Prince Abdullah appears to have been successful at Crawford in persuading President Bush that Riyadh's approach will be different than that of the 1990s, when the United States swayed Israeli governments toward a final-status deal with the Palestinians, but the Arab governments did not do anything comparable with Arafat. The Saudis evidently claim that they are ready for a "division of labor" -- if the United States sways Sharon, the Saudis will press Arafat and ensure that the Palestinian Authority fights terrorism. Of course, it remains unclear whether Riyadh will follow through. Senior U.S. officials say that Arafat has proven skeptical of quiet diplomatic messages from Arab leaders if he believes that their purpose is to satisfy Washington. They say that Arafat would only be disabused of this skepticism if these leaders were to go public in their criticism, something they have virtually never done.

Fourth, the Saudi approach's momentum has been fueled by another force: the vacuum that has resulted from Sharon's refusal to publicly follow up his strategy of incursions in the West Bank with a political strategy of addressing the issues at hand. At the same time, in [a recent] interview...with Nightline host Ted Koppel, Sharon insisted that he [would] come with a detailed plan during his meeting with Bush next week. Sharon also mentioned the idea of a peace conference during the recent Powell swing to the region, but gave very few details.

Conference Options

As the Bush administration debates whether to convene a Middle East peace conference, it should be pointed out that any conference will face many obstacles, including the role of Arafat, the linkage of any deal to Palestinian political and economic reform, and the role of the international community in relation to those talks. The greatest obstacle, though, is likely to be the scope of these talks. Here are the possible options:

• Imposed deal: Israel would be told to return to the 1967 ceasefire lines, possibly with minor modifications such as the Clinton parameters of December 2000. This approach is certain to be opposed by Sharon, who would see it as an imposed plan to divide Jerusalem and jeopardize Israeli security by ceding over time its eastern frontier, the Jordan Valley. Sharon will believe that he can rally the Israeli public against the idea in the wake of a year and a half of violence, "homicide bombings," and a prevailing sense in Israel that the Palestinian leadership has evinced very little interest in reconciliation or counter terrorism -- points that Israel saw as the cornerstone of the Oslo Accords.

• Interim deal conference: The conference would be devoted to negotiating the establishment of a Palestinian state on part of the West Bank and Gaza, along with an international economic effort to revive the Palestinian and Israeli economies. Sharon has accepted the idea of Palestinian statehood, but an interim deal could be opposed by the Palestinians. Believing the Saudi initiative and the Clinton parameters brought them tantalizingly close to the 1967 lines, and having been disillusioned with the Oslo gradualism in the past, the Palestinians are likely to oppose anything short of 100 percent of their territorial demands.

• Partial deal plus final status timetable conference: Such a conference, which would be somewhere between the first two approaches, could focus immediately on an interim accord while putting forward a timetable to resolve deferred issues such as refugees and Jerusalem. Should the Palestinians be coaxed into accepting this approach, they will likely want a hard timetable which they will want enforced by the international community. In contrast, Israel will likely seek a soft timetable predicated on proven Palestinian performance over time in spheres of counter terrorism and reconciliation to ensure a sense of balance between concepts that have governed this peace process: land for the Palestinians and peace for Israel.

David Makovsky is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute.

Each year the U.S. State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counter terrorism releases a report on international terrorism. The report focuses primarily on international terrorism (rather than domestic terrorism) because of its direct impact on U.S. interests. Following are excerpts of the report, released Tuesday, May 21, 2002. Full text of the report can be viewed at http://www.state.gov/.

Middle East Overview: Middle East terrorism witnessed two major developments this year. On the one hand, terrorist groups and their state sponsors continued their terrorist activities and planning throughout 2001 ...

On the other, however, most Middle Eastern countries -- including some with which the United States has political difficulties -- showed an unprecedented degree of cooperation with the Coalition's campaign against terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks .... Middle Eastern governments that still lack peace agreements with Israel, most notably Syria and Lebanon, cooperated with the US Government and its partners in investigating al-Qaida and some other organizations, but they refused to recognize Hizballah, HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian rejectionist groups for what they are -- terrorists. They and other Arab/Muslim countries held the view that violent activities by these groups constitute legitimate resistance. They sometimes even condone Palestinian suicide bombings and other attacks against civilian targets within Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip.

Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip: Traditionally, Israel has been one of the United States' staunchest supporters in fighting terrorism. September 11 reinforced US-Israeli security cooperation in this area. There is no known al-Qaida presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat forcefully denounced the September 11 attacks. Even HAMAS publicly distanced itself from Usama Bin Ladin.

Israeli-Palestinian violence escalated in 2001, and terrorist activity increased in scale and lethality. Israel responded to terrorist attacks with military strikes against PA facilities, targeted killings of suspected terrorists, and tightened security measures, including roadblocks and closures of Palestinian towns and villages.

HAMAS conducted several suicide bombings inside Israeli cities from March to June, culminating in the attack outside a Tel Aviv nightclub on 1 June that killed 22 Israeli teenagers.... On 9 August, HAMAS mounted a suicide attack in a Jerusalem pizzeria, killing 15 persons. Attacks by the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) against Israel...included car bombings, shooting attacks, and suicide bombings...on 4 November...PIJ...ambushed an Israeli bus carrying schoolchildren. The attack killed two children...and wounded at least 35 other persons.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) raised its profile in 2001[, carrying] out car bombings in Jerusalem.... The PFLP...assassinated Israeli cabinet minister Rehav'am Ze'evi in an East Jerusalem hotel on 17 October, purportedly in retaliation for Israel's killing of its leader, Abu Ali Mustafa.

Members of the Tanzim, which is made up of small and loosely organized cells of militants drawn from the street-level membership of Fatah, conducted attacks against Israeli targets in the West Bank...al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade...claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the West Bank....Israeli Arabs...appeared to have played a limited role in the violence in 2001. On 9 September, Israeli Arab Muhammad Hubayshi conducted a suicide attack at a train station in Nahariyah. HAMAS claimed credit for the attack. Israeli Arabs generally refrained from aiding and abetting terrorists from the West Bank and Gaza, however. At year's end, Israel indicted four Israeli Arabs linked to rejectionist groups....

Jewish extremists attacked Palestinian civilians and their properties in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2001.... In April, six Israeli policemen were wounded when settlers blew up a Palestinian shop. In late November, Israel's Shin Bet security service assessed that five Palestinians were killed and fourteen wounded in attacks that were likely staged by Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Investigations into many of these attacks produced inconclusive results, leading to several arrests but no formal charges....

Unlike the pre-intifadah era, when Israeli-PA security cooperation was generally effective, PA counterterrorism activities remained sporadic throughout the year. Israel's destruction of the PA's security infrastructure contributed to the ineffectiveness of the PA. Significantly reduced Israeli-PA security cooperation and a lax security environment allowed HAMAS and other groups to rebuild terrorist infrastructure in the Palestinian territories....

Early in December, the White House called upon Arafat to take "meaningful, long-term and enduring action against terrorists operating out of Palestinian territory." On 16 December, Arafat issued a public statement urging adherence to his call for a cease-fire. This was followed by PA arrests of dozens of HAMAS and PIJ activists, although the conditions of their arrest and the military role that some of them may have played remain unclear....In December, and under pressure from the PA, HAMAS announced that it would halt suicide attacks within Israel.... The top PIJ leadership inside and outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip did not endorse Arafat's call for a cease-fire agreement. (In January 2002, Israeli forces boarded the vessel Karine-A in the Red Sea and uncovered nearly 50 tons of Iranian arms, including Katyusha missiles, apparently bound for militants in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.)

Saudi Arabia: After September 11 and the realization that 15 of 19 of the attackers were Saudi citizens, the Saudi Government reaffirmed its commitment to combat terrorism and responded positively to requests for concrete action in support of Coalition efforts against al-Qaida and the Taliban. The King, Crown Prince, Government-appointed religious leaders, and official news media publicly and consistently condemned terrorism and refuted the few ideological and religious justifications made by some clerics.

In October, the Saudi Government announced it would implement UNSCR 1373, which called for, among other things, the freezing of terrorist related funds ... In December, Saudi authorities agreed to cooperate with US investigators in suspected cases of terrorism financing. Several threats against US civilian and military personnel and facilities in Saudi Arabia were reported in 2001, but none materialized. By year's end, Saudi authorities had finished an investigation into a series of bombings in Riyadh and the Eastern Province...determined that the bombings were criminal rather than political in motivation. In October an apparent suicide bombing in al-Khubar killed one US citizen and injured another. The Saudi investigation since revealed that the bomber was a Palestinian, acting alone, for unverified motives relating to the Palestinian intifadah...

State-Sponsored Terrorism - Iran: Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2001. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps...and Ministry of Intelligence and Security...continued to be involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and supported a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals. Although some within Iran would like to end this support, hardliners who hold the reins of power continue to thwart any efforts to moderate these policies. Since the outbreak of the intifadah, support has intensified for Palestinian groups that use violence against Israel. During the past year, however, Iran appears to have reduced its involvement in other forms of terrorist activity. There is no evidence of Iranian sponsorship or foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks in the United States. President Khatami condemned the attacks and offered condolences to the American people. During 2001, Iran sought a high-profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli activity by way of increasing its support for anti-Israeli terrorist groups. Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to refer to Israel as a "cancerous tumor" that must be removed. Matching this rhetoric with action, Iran continued to provide Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups-notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-GC-with varying amounts of funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. It also encouraged Hizballah and the rejectionist Palestinian groups to coordinate their planning and to escalate their activities.

Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The report describes in detail groups the State Department has designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Among them are these anti-Israel groups: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, HAMAS, Hizballah, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).

As American and Israeli demands have arisen for reform in the Palestinian Authority, similar demands have been heard from the Palestinian public and its leaders. Below are excerpts from the Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 96 and 97 of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) www.memri.org

Part I: Political Reforms

A. Disband the Government, Assemble a New One Members of both the Palestinian cabinet and the Legislative Council demanded disbandment of the present failing government and the assembly of a new one.

Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Nabil Amru, who led the calls for reform, sought to declare the present government transitional and to put together a new government. Amru, who resigned because his reform proposal was rejected, told the Palestinian Authority daily Al-Ayyam that Arafat had showed some understanding of his proposal but disagreed with the suggested ways of implementing it. Another major proposal was to establish a government of Palestinian experts, with a limited number of ministers.

A document drawn up by the Legislative Council's Political Committee proposed declaring the present government transitional and assembling a small government of technocrats with no more than 19 ministers...

Following the calls for disbanding the government ... local Government Minister and negotiating team head Saeb Ereqat told Al-Jazeera television, "All members of the government, not just 20 ministers, submitted their resignations to President Arafat..."

To date, Arafat has not yet accepted their resignations.

B. Arafat's Status and Separation of Authorities Legislative Council Member, Hatem 'Abd Al-Qader openly criticized Arafat... : "No single apparatus should execute political negotiations, security tasks, and provision of services simultaneously ... This means that the brother, the symbol [that is, Arafat], must relinquish some of his executive authorities."

'Abd Al-Qader also demanded that there be a clear separation between the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA) ... According to Fatah Secretary-General in the West Bank Hussein Al-Sheikh, separating the authorities will also solve the problem of corruption in the PA...

The Legislative Council's Political Committee also presented proposals regarding the function of the security apparatuses, which, it said, must refrain from engaging in political matters and must not maintain contact with Israel except for security coordination ... [and] must also keep out of economic matters and money collection.

In response to the demand of the separation of authorities, Arafat accepted a bill for an independent Palestinian judiciary system at its second reading in the Legislative Council ... He did not, however, refer to the other elements in 'Abd Al-Qader's demand (such as reducing some of Arafat's authorities).

The Legislative Council welcomed Arafat's approval of the law, but noted that more steps were necessary ... The council also demanded ... the merging and reconstitution of the Palestinian judiciary ... [and the] establishment of new courts in accordance with the new law.

Another bill ... was approved by Arafat. The law defined the character of Palestine, set out the Palestinian citizen's general freedoms and rights, defined the roles and areas of responsibility of the legislative authority, the executive authority, ... and the judiciary, and defined the essence of the emergency laws and the transitional laws.

C. Holding Elections Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), secretary of the PLO Executive Committee, limited the demand for elections to the municipal and Legislative Council elections only ... But others proposed holding presidential elections as well ... Dr. 'Abd Al-Sattar Qassem, a lecturer on political science at Al-Najah University in Nablus, declared his intention to challenge Yasser Arafat in a presidential election if one were held.

However, in his speech to the Legislative Council, Arafat was completely ambiguous about his position on elections: "Allow me, brothers and sisters, to propose to you, in all honesty and responsibility, that elections be held as soon as possible..."

Two days later, Arafat expressed a different stand on the matter: "Elections will be held as soon as possible after the end of the occupation of our land." ... Despite these declarations, Legislative Council Chairman Ahmad Qurei (Abu 'Alaa) announced that elections for the Palestinian municipalities would be held in 2002, while Legislative Council elections would be held in 2003.

The Central Election Committee, headed by Abu Mazen, submitted its resignation to Arafat; a committee member who refused to be identified said that this was because no [precise] election date had been set ...

Part II: Security and Economic Reforms

A. Reform in the Security Apparatuses The Legislative Council issued a document proposing: limiting the terms served by the commanders to four years; reducing the number of security apparatuses; placing the apparatuses under a civil authority ... ; assembling a national security council to be headed by the president ... ; and preventing the security organizations ... from engaging in politics, information, fee collection, and from maintaining contact with Israel except for security coordination. PLO Executive Committee Secretary Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) sought restrictions on the number of security apparatuses, and clear definitions of their areas of responsibility ... Former minister of parliamentary affairs Nabil Amru called for oversight by the political leadership of the security apparatuses, while Legislative Council member Qaddura Fares, proposed replacing all heads of the security apparatuses, since over eight years had passed since their appointment.

Muhammad Dahlan, head of the Preventive Security apparatus in the Gaza Strip, also spoke of the need to replace all the commanders, including himself, saying that all wanted to leave their posts.

In an interview with CNN, Arafat rejected the suggestion that the security apparatuses be merged ... A completely different picture emerged from the words of Arafat's economic advisor and close confidant Muhammad Rashid.

Rashid claimed that the PA had already agreed to merge the 12 security apparatuses ... The Palestinian Authority daily Al-Ayyam reported that Arafat was on the verge of approving a comprehensive plan for reorganizing the Palestinian security establishment. The plan reduced the number of apparatuses to four ... Force 17 would remain as the presidential guard; only the police and the internal security apparatus would be able to make arrests; the apparatuses in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would merge; there would be a national security council which would include the apparatus heads; and the commanders' terms of office would be restricted to four years... PA ministers reported that during a conference of the Palestinian leadership, Arafat said that the security apparatuses would be reorganized.

Arafat also decided to put together a "supreme security committee" which would include the national security forces, police, intelligence, presidential security, military intelligence, and preventive security...

B. Economic Reforms The Palestinian officials who sought reform focused on the need to fight corruption and to oversee PA funds ... Legislative Council member Qaddura Fares proposed handling the problem of corruption as follows: all the economic authority's funds should be part of the general PA budget, so that its expenses could be monitored.

Additional proposals appeared in a document drawn up by the Legislative Council which demanded: an end to the proliferation of decision makers and areas of responsibility for handling PA funds; ... exclusive supervision of PA income by the Treasury Ministry; [and] combining the accounts of the General Treasury into one comprehensive account... Abu Mazen, secretary of the PLO Executive Committee, said that economic reform should focus on preventing the transfer of donations from foreign NGOs to Palestinian NGOs: "There must be order in all financial matters, and, like in every other country in the world, there must be one source to which the funds will flow, and another from which they will be issued..."

As a first step towards economic reform, Arafat approved the National Bank Law, that will apply to all PA banks ... To date, no details on the new law have been released.

C. U.S. and Israeli Involvement in the Reforms Top Palestinian officials who called for reforms stressed that their reform demands had nothing to do with those emerging from the U.S. and Israel ... Minister of Planning and Regional Cooperation Nabil Sha'ath declared, "Improvement and reform are a Palestinian matter.

The goals and the tools for it are Palestinian, and they have won unanimous agreement on the part of the Palestinian people. No non-Palestinian element must be permitted to interfere in this matter." ... Despite denials of American involvement, statements by Arafat's economic advisor Muhammad Rashid indicate that American and Palestinian officials are working together on reform in the PA. According to him, he and the American officials set a timetable for democratic reform in the PA, and both sides want to make essential changes in the political and security authority bodies prior to the international conference slated for late June or early July...

Israel began construction of a 115-kilometer-long (71-mile) security fence aimed at preventing Palestinian terrorists from infiltrating into Israel. Below are excerpts from bitterlemons.org Edition no. 21, "Fences and Walls." Bitterlemons.org is a website that presents Israeli and Palestinian viewpoints on prominent issues of concern (www.bitterlemons.org).

The June 5 suicide bombing of a bus near Megiddo in northern Israel in which 17 Israelis were killed was typical. First a car was stolen in Lod and driven across the Green Line into the West Bank. There it was fitted with explosives. Then, on the appointed day, it was driven back into Israel and exploded next to the bus. The ease with which Palestinian terrorists can drive stolen cars across the Green Line is of course indicative of the ease with which suicide bombers can cross this border on foot. It is a scandal.

Yet in the course of many long months of repeated suicide bombings the Sharon government refused to take the obvious minimal step needed to protect 97 percent of its citizens who live within the Green Line. It clearly feared that the building of physical barriers along the Green Line would have negative ramifications for the viability of the settlements housing the remaining 3 percent of Israelis who live beyond the Green Line, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In other words, the government feared that the fence would become the de facto political border.

Now, hundreds of deaths later, Prime Minister Sharon and Defense Minister Ben Eliezer have acquiesced. In view of the immense popularity of the fence idea among the public, coupled with their own fear of popular disapproval if they continue to neglect the public's most fundamental welfare, they have undertaken to build fences and walls on or near the Green Line--initially in the most vulnerable areas in the north and center of the country, and eventually everywhere.

Yet the concept of separation by fences is far more complex than it may appear initially. Militarily, fences and walls will have no effect on mortar or rocket attacks launched from the West Bank against Israel, and little effect against determined aggressive intruders unless the fences are patrolled. But the forces needed to patrol them are busy guarding the settlements, particularly those located in the midst of large Palestinian population concentrations in Gaza and the West Bank heartland. Hence many of the grassroots advocates of fences, led by the Council for Peace and Security, insist that their construction be accompanied by unilateral withdrawal from these settlements, first and foremost in order to free up forces for a more orderly and efficient effort to protect Israel against suicide bombers. The fence would then be designed so as to comprise the settlement blocs located near the Green Line, thereby protecting some 70 percent of the settlers as well. While the public supports this idea, most of the political parties currently represented in the Knesset do not. Thus there is little likelihood that settlements will be dismantled in the near future, thereby somewhat limiting the military utility of the fence.

In this regard, it is important to note the example of the Gaza Strip. The Gaza-Israel border, some 45 kilometers long, has been fenced for around 10 years. Not a single suicide bomber has penetrated it into Israel. But the settlements located inside the Strip remain vulnerable to attack, and require large contingents of troops to patrol them.

The fence will have heavy ramifications for Palestinians, too. Politically, they will attack the idea. Militarily, they may interpret dismantling of settlements as a sign of Israeli weakness. Economically, illegal commuters will be barred from work in Israel.

As for the ramifications for peace, some advocates of separation, like Labor's Haim Ramon, in effect seek to present the line delineated by the fencing of the Green Line together with the settlement blocs as a de facto political border. Others point out that, even after dismantling isolated settlements, Israel will hold onto the Jordan Valley for strategic security reasons, as well as Greater Jerusalem, which cannot be rationally "separated" by fences, pending final status negotiations in which all the land of the West Bank will be on the table. According to this position, unilateral withdrawal and the building of fences should not be confused with the drawing of borders. In any case, most advocates of separation now assert, convincingly, that Israel does not currently have a peace partner on the Palestinian side, and must therefore act unilaterally in accordance with its own needs.

Finally, the demographic issue. The dismantling of outlying settlements in Gaza and the West Bank heartland could literally rescue Israel from impending demographic disaster. The settlers, with the loftiest of Zionist motives for redeeming the Land, are increasingly plunging Israel into a South African situation, with the Area A Palestinian cities filling the roll of Bantustans, and an Arab majority between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River a matter of a few more years. The more settlements are built and the more Palestinians are born, the more difficult will be the inevitable effort to disentangle us from this threat. Building fences--despite their drawbacks--will hopefully catalyze a process of demographic security as well as enhanced physical security. Yossi Alpher is an Israeli strategic analyst. He is former Director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University.

A Palestinian View: "Peace in pieces" by Ghassan Khatib

The recent Israeli government decision to begin building extensive walls around Palestinians is just one more example of how Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is unable to deal with Israeli problems save through his narrow security vision. Sharon is blind to the political dimensions of the ongoing violence and is therefore unwilling to engage in a political process.

Unfortunately, serious political talks are the only way out of the current conflict, a struggle that has been terribly costly for both Palestinians and Israelis.

Indeed, Sharon seems to have forgotten the historic failure of fences and walls--there is not a single example in which divisions like these have been able to stop those bent on getting past them. Most recent, but not most insignificant is the example of the Berlin Wall, which not only fell after time, but was porous even at its mightiest.

Besides lacking vision, Sharon's approach is terribly dangerous. It can only be seen as an integral part of a comprehensive strategy pursued by this Israeli government and one likely to be promoted by Sharon in his coming trip to the United States. That strategy is to gradually divide the West Bank and Gaza Strip into isolated population centers. This will have a dramatic effect on geography and society and the already-disintegrating Palestinian economy.

Further, while attention is focused on the dramatic events of these confrontations, the Israeli government is adding to the single greatest threat to prospects for peace: the settlements. At the same time that Palestinians are being blocked into specific areas, the settlements are sprouting up and being used by the Israeli government as a tool for further shattering the Palestinian territories into pieces. One must be careful not to misunderstand the implications of these new walls and fences. It is not simply that Israel is creating barriers along its borders, but rather that these fences are part of a policy of creating what Israelis call a "buffer zone." These areas of heightened Israeli control in the occupied Palestinian territories cut deep wedges out of the West Bank, at places taking 10-kilometer-deep chunks out of its narrowest places, a waistline that measures no more that 50 kilometers at times. All of these new elements undertaken in the name of security actually systematically undermine the basis for the peace process, i.e. historic territorial compromise on the basis of the 1967 borders as mentioned in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.

This effect is complemented by the gradual but methodical practices of the Israeli army to undermine the Palestinian Authority and cancel out Palestinian control over any Palestinian land, leaving the Authority with only an administrative role to fill a completely impossible mandate. The reasons for this systematic unraveling of these understandings of peace are the ideological beliefs of Sharon and his allies. Theirs is an ideology based on religion and history and power politics, where all of historic Palestine is Israel's birthright according to religion, and where the only way to achieve this is by force (and, when force doesn't work, more force).

Too, there is a deep racism that lies behind the strategy of walls and fences preventing movement in only one direction and confining only Palestinians, when Israeli settlers and the army are permitted to move both directions at will. The building of these barriers can only deepen the injustice of Palestinian daily life, making the most basic tasks and joys more difficult, and as a result inspiring increasing hatred and violence and counter-violence.

The sum effect of these actions will be bad news for the more than half of Israeli society that continues to support a withdrawal from territory and the settlements as part of a peaceful compromise. On the other hand, the transformation of this conflict into an existential battle with no space for a middle ground will only satisfy extremists on both sides. Ghassan Khatib is minister of labor in the new Palestinian Authority cabinet. He has served for many years as a political analyst and media contact.

"Analyzing President Bush's New Framework For Mideast Peace" By Robert Satloff, Director of Policy and Strategic Planning at The Washington Institute, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/.

Key Points.

The main thrust of President Bush's speech marked a distinct departure from longstanding international efforts made toward Arab-Israeli peace.

For the first time, the United States has declared that progress in Middle East peacemaking is dependent on the internal political development of one of the actors; in other words, democracy must come before U.S. support for statehood. ... At the same time, the president effectively rejected a timeline-focused negotiation process in favor of performance based diplomacy. While the president noted the possibility of fulfilling all requirements for statehood within three years, the wording of his comments was subdued and noncommittal; the agreement, he said, "could" -- not "should" -- be reached within that timeframe.

The president also introduced a new idea -- "provisional statehood" -- as a waystation between the current Palestinian Authority and the eventual creation of a sovereign state according to the vision of "two states, side by side." Originally, this idea was conceived as a diplomatic inducement for Palestinians to reap an early reward for choosing diplomacy over terror. But no part of the president's speech indicates that Palestinians are likely to earn even this new interim status anytime soon, as he offers no dates, only prerequisites. ... Democracy, beyond Arafat. Although the conceptual shift in U.S. policy enunciated by the president was profound, most headlines are sure to highlight his call for Palestinians to replace Arafat and his colleagues with a new breed of leadership. ... With this call for leadership change, the president may have opened himself up to criticism by some in the Arab world who would protest American interference in internal Palestinian national decisions. Nevertheless, he is sure to be cheered by vast numbers of Arabs and Muslims whose disappointment will be that the president did not extend his call for leadership change and democratic transition to their countries as well. ...Questions for U.S. Policy. While this bold presidential statement laid out a general agenda to guide U.S. efforts in the coming months, the speech left unanswered several key questions. These include:

• Will the United States continue to deal with Yasir Arafat as the "democratically elected leader of the Palestinian people," in the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, now that President Bush has called for the rais's replacement? Operationally, will U.S. diplomats discuss implementing the president's call for reform with Palestinian leaders that the president has said must go?

• How will U.S. policy respond should Israel decide to bring about leadership change before a Palestinian election next February, in order to secure the protection of its citizenry?

• Are there any circumstances under which the United States will recognize the legitimacy of an election victory by Arafat?

• What role will various actors -- American, European, Arab, Israeli -- play in fulfilling the supervisory and oversight functions outlined by the president? Who will determine the certification benchmarks and what constitutes ongoing satisfactory performance?

• What lies behind the awkward construction, twice repeated, that the incipient Palestinian state must reach an agreement on security with Egypt and Jordan, in addition to Israel? Does this suggest that the provisional Palestine may enjoy some form of early "border control" responsibilities?

• What actually triggers Israeli conciliatory moves, such as a settlement freeze and redeployment of forces to the positions held prior to September 2000, before the start of the Palestinian uprising?

The text suggests that Israel need only remain committed to its previous promises to implement the Mitchell Commission recommendations on both these issues, which require substantial Palestinian action before Israeli counteraction.

Political Context.

This speech represents a major gamble for the Bush administration. Prodded by Arabs and Europeans to lay out a detailed vision for moving forward in the Middle East, the president presented a plan that will satisfy neither; after all, the president focused heavily on the need for leadership change (i.e., no more "last chances" for Arafat) and on adding a new (and, in legal terms, uncertain) stage of provisional statehood before the prospect of Palestinian statehood becomes real. At the same time, the president committed his office to intensive engagement on the details of Palestinian reform, in all its aspects. Avoiding the slippery slope toward becoming "trustee" of a new Palestinian "mandate" while fulfilling this commitment will be a tricky enterprise.

Perhaps most difficult of all: guiding this process through sure opposition both from Arafat (despite rhetorical acceptance) and the avowedly antipeace organizations within the Palestinian community.

For the silent Palestinian majority, the president offered a hopeful, democratic future - one that will be built with the full support of the United States; for the atavistic leadership of the Palestinian Authority and its tacit colleagues in antipeace organizations like Hamas and the alAqsa Martyrs Brigades, fighting the president's vision through terrorism and violence will be a high priority.

... "Making Bush's Vision Realistic" By Dennis Ross, envoy to the Middle East in the Clinton administration, Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Published in the NY Times, June 26, 2002.

... The words are right, but I do not see the mechanism for connecting diplomacy to the realities on the ground. Secretary Powell has been asked by Mr. Bush to work intensively with others "on a comprehensive plan to support Palestinian reform and institution building." Who on the Palestinian side will he work with? In the period before elections and the creation of new institutions, who other than the remnants of the Palestinian Authority can Secretary Powell find to stop the violence? And make no mistake: no diplomatic effort, no reform process, no political talks will have any chance of success if the violence continues, because the day-to-day situation of terrorism and reprisals is a force that will continue to overwhelm any plan.

Acts of terror like last week's suicide bombings will continue to produce Israeli responses. No country would be passive in the face of such attacks. But the Israeli responses are inevitably placing Palestinian towns, villages and cities - indeed, the whole Palestinian population - under an increasingly tight siege. In such circumstances, simple movement, not to mention institutional reform, will be impossible to carry out.

Therefore, the first order of business has to be stopping the violence. The Israelis will not pull back unless they have a reason to believe that the terror will abate. And certainly at this point they will not trust Palestinian promises.

The United States will need to take the lead. In the near term, stopping the terror means working with those Palestinians in the Palestinian Authority who still have the means to fight terror and aiding them as they act to fulfill this mission. Since it is neither practical nor realistic to assume that such efforts are possible throughout all of the West Bank and Gaza, why not try a rolling approach to new security measures, starting in Gaza?

The Palestinian security forces are basically intact in Gaza, and the Israeli presence is far less intrusive there than it is in the West Bank. With Palestinian intellectuals taking out ads in the newspapers calling for a halt to attacks against Israeli civilians, now is a good time to test whether any part of the Palestinian Authority is willing to act forcefully against Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza. If the Palestinian security forces do act, a similar effort could begin in different parts of the West Bank. They could start by taking action, for example, in the Jericho area, the only city in the West Bank where the Israeli army currently does not have a presence. If the Palestinians perform adequately in Gaza and Jericho, the Israelis could pull back forces from those areas and eventually from other areas where Palestinian security forces act to counter terrorism.

... This approach would not expose the Israelis to new threats of terror and would provide some proof of Palestinian intentions. Equally important will be the readiness of the Palestinian Authority to condemn by name and confront Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and others.

Palestinian leaders allied with Mr. Arafat will claim that to confront Hamas and others they need to be able to show the people what will be gained. Mr. Bush is not likely to satisfy this counter demand. But American support remains important to Palestinian statehood, and he has indicated that such support depends on Palestinian performance. At the same time, it is significant that Mr. Bush reiterated his call for a politically and economically viable Palestinian state, with details to be fleshed out in future negotiations. Assuming Palestinian performance, we should insist on reciprocal Israeli moves designed to provide the Palestinians the space to develop. We should also provide financial assistance for Palestinian institutional reforms. Of course, the Palestinians have to show the world that there will be only one authority and that independent militias with their own agendas and weapons will not be tolerated.

... If the Palestinians are not ready to accept this challenge, the probable outcome will be Israeli reoccupation of Palestinian areas or unilateral separation. The former is not sustainable over time, and the latter, though more likely, would be an admission that diplomatic solutions are simply unavailable for the foreseeable future. In such a circumstance, the wall that the Israelis have begun to build in the West Bank will be more than just an obstacle to terrorists; it will also dash Palestinian hopes for a viable state any time soon.

PRESIDENT BUSH'S MIDDLE EAST SPEECH PART II: REACTIONS

Jewish Council for Public Affairs: "...President Bush made it clear that the Palestinian people would get a state through reform and not through terrorism. The president is correct that there can be no reward for those who use violence and terrorism in an attempt to advance a political agenda, and for recognizing that Yasser Arafat has become a clear obstacle to peace who must be replaced. We agree that a Palestinian state cannot be considered until there is a 'sustained' fight against the terrorists and the dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure.

" Senate Republican Leader Trent Lott, R-MS: "I support President Bush's desire to see that all Israeli and Palestinian people in the Middle East live in peace. President Bush's address also sends a strong message to the Palestinians that the way to peace is not paved with acts of terror, but with good faith negotiations and acceptance that Israel has a right to exist. We in Congress will work with the President to bring peace, at long last, to the Middle East."

Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, D-SD: "... The President is right to note that, provisional or not, statehood not only confers rights, it imposes responsibilities. As a number of us have been saying, statehood requires leaders that seek the betterment of their people, and not the perpetuation of their own power. Since the current leadership has repeatedly failed in this regard, I, like the President, believe that peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership. I also agree with the President that other Arab states have a critical role to play. They can help bring the Palestinian people a state, but they can only do so by choosing peace, renouncing terror, and abandoning support for those who seek Israel's destruction. Finally, there must be a universal understanding that suicide bombing can only end this process, and not advance it. We must not allow a Palestinian state to be built on the backs of suicide bombers.

..." Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, R-IL: "I think the President has struck the right balance with his proposal to bring peace to the Middle East His call for a new Palestinian state that works to end corruption and stop terrorism makes sense. But the President also understands that creating such a state will require time and a new, democratically elected Palestinian leadership...Terrorism must never be rewarded.

..." U.S. House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, D-MO: "I agree with President Bush that the Palestinian people need a new leadership that is both willing to fight terrorism and negotiate a just and lasting peace with Israel....we shouldn't expect that the Palestinian people will be able to accomplish these steps on their own...We must work intensively with the parties in the region to implement these measures, and provide the technical and financial assistance needed to do it...I therefore urge the Bush Administration to intensify its level of engagement to fundamentally change the situation on the ground...."

Israel: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon: "Israel is a country that desires peace. ... when there is a complete cessation of terror, violence and incitement, and when the Palestinian Authority enacts genuine reforms, including new leadership at the top, such that a different Authority is created, then it will be possible to discuss how to make progress on the political tracks."

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres: "The speech contained some very clear and important things. But problems still remain that need to be handled, and handled seriously. ... An important part of the speech was the clarity concerning the vision about the solution of the conflict between us and the Palestinians. What is needed in addition is how to arrive at all those forthcoming steps.

" The Palestinian Authority: Chairman Yasser Arafat: "[Bush] spoke about a Palestinian state and elections. ... The Palestinian people can decide who should be their elected chief. They are the only ones who can determine this. ... We will respect all the principles the Palestinian people support."

United Nations: UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan: "... forcing a change in the Palestinian top command could backfire. ... You could find yourself in a situation that the radicals are the ones that get elected, and it would be the result of a democratic process and we have to accept that. ... I hope the Israelis and the Palestinians will have the courage, the wisdom, and the strength to seize this moment for us to work on the establishment of a Palestinian state, living side-by-side of an Israeli state with security.

" European Union: EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana: The EU is ready to help organize elections that would give the Palestinians "an opportunity to choose their leaders. ... The elected leaders are the elected leaders and we will deal with them. ... An early international conference...is more than ever necessary."

Britain: British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw: "We deal with leaders who are elected ... If President Arafat were re-elected by the Palestinian Authority, we would deal with him. ... Both parties have a duty to take up President Bush's initiative. There is no other way forward. ..."

Russia: Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Yakovenko: "This initiative shows that the United States wants to actively promote normalization of the situation in the region." (Prior to the speech, President Vladimir Putin said it would be "dangerous and mistaken to remove [Arafat] from the political arena.")

Japan: Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi: "[The proposal] is something we appreciate. And it's important for Japan to contribute to the debate on the creation of a Palestinian state."

Egypt: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak: "Bush's speech was balanced to a great extent. ... The Palestinian Authority supported this statement, and if the Authority itself supported the statement, then we support it, because it is balanced to great extent. ...I did not see any indication in the statement that calls for ousting Arafat, just calls for reforming the Authority and finding a new administration, and this has a very wide meaning. We are waiting for Powell to come and explain to us some issues, how to implement these ideas and to learn what is meant by reform."

Jordan: Statement issued by the Jordanian government: "We see this as the beginning of the end of the conflict between Arabs and Israelis. Bush's speech is in line with our position that an endgame and a timeline should be defined so that the political process can be re-launched.

" Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan J. Muasher: "The president was very tough on Arafat and the Palestinians, certainly, but once we look beyond the tough words at the framework he set out, it is a positive framework. We have a goal to end the occupation in three years. It comes with a lot conditions, sure, but we are ready to take this."

Saudi Arabia: Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah: "When the elections happen in the Palestinian territories it is the Palestinians themselves who will choose their leader in a democratic fashion. Only the Palestinians can choose their own leaders. Whoever they choose should be acceptable to the international community."

Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee: "...It's even more unrealistic to talk about creating a democracy among non-citizens of a non-state under foreign military occupation without sovereignty.... ....There is no freedom of speech, no freedom of movement. Any of the kinds of things that could make an election meaningful in practice....What I [Hussein Ibish, national communications director] had gathered about [the speech] is that it would be a set of unrealistic set of proposals (sic), but I'm surprised by how unrealistic they are and by how one-sided the speech is.... My conclusion from this is that the president is still basing his Middle East policy more on domestic political considerations regarding the power of the pro-Israel lobby than on the natural interests of the United States...."

By Steven L. Spiegel and M.J. Rosenberg, June 27, 2002 President Bush has called for Palestinian "multi-party local elections by the end of the year, with national elections to follow." Below is an analysis piece (emphasis added) from the Israel Policy Forum (IPF), e-mail: ipf@ipforum.org.

In his speech on [June 24], President Bush stated that the United States would support the establishment of a Palestinian state when a democratically-elected Palestinian leadership emerges that is "not compromised by terror."

The President did not mention PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, but even the most cursory reading of the speech indicates that the Bush administration has now adopted Prime Minister Sharon's view that the only acceptable Palestinian state is one without Yasir Arafat in power. Arafat responded to Bush by announcing that the Palestinian Authority will hold elections in January 2003 for President and parliament. Municipal elections will take place in March. Arafat's announcement was followed by one from Arafat aide Nabil Shaath, stating that Arafat intends to be a candidate in those elections. The Administration has also indefinitely postponed the idea of a regional peace conference.

Colin Powell said that in light of the recent spate of bombings, a ministerial level conference was being "set back by the inability to achieve a reasonable level of quiet that will give people confidence to move forward and sit around a table and start to discuss issues related to security, to humanitarian support and economic development, as well as a political horizon."

What then can happen in the aftermath of the speech? At least four scenarios come to mind.

Scenario 1:

The election takes place on schedule and is certified by international observers as "free and fair." Arafat is defeated by a relative moderate, like Mohammed Dahlan, Arafat's security chief.

This result is ostensibly the one the administration wants: democracy and no Arafat, although it is also one that the Sharon government may not want (and certainly does not expect) to happen. Why? Because this would lead to U.S. recognition of a provisional Palestinian state in three years. It is at this point that the President's stated determination that "the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized borders" comes into play.

This is most likely the scenario the administration cites when trying to convince U.S. allies and Arab moderates that the Bush approach merits support. The problem here is that it is unlikely that a viable moderate would even run against Arafat. If one did, the administration would have to make it clear that it would not support a Palestinian state if Arafat was re-elected and would not engage in diplomacy to that end.

Therefore, the administration will likely find itself or its surrogates (i.e. NGO's) intimately involved in the Palestinian election campaign, an untenable position to be in. There is already a hint of this new approach in President Bush's statement yesterday that he would cut off aid to the Palestinians if they did not implement the type of reform proposals he advocated on Monday.

Scenario 2:

The election takes place on schedule, but Arafat is not a candidate; a moderate wins. Arafat's removal from the race takes place either by his own decision (very unlikely) or because he is removed from the scene through expulsion by Israel. According to media reports, the Sharon government has successfully convinced the administration that Arafat himself was behind at least some of the recent acts of terror in Israel. If that is the case, it is possible that the administration is now willing to see Arafat expelled. Certainly the Bush speech, in its treatment of Arafat as a non-person, gave no indication that the U.S. has any concern for Arafat or what happens to him. Under this scenario, Arafat, in exile, is unable to compete in the election and a moderate triumphs. The U.S. then calls on Israel to do its part. The three year clock delineated by the president as the deadline for creating a state starts ticking.

Pitfalls:

The obvious pitfall in both scenarios 1 and 2 is that Arafat may well be re-elected, even in exile. Indeed, it is more than likely that other candidates would pull out of the race in a symbolic show of support for the exiled leader, who would be freer abroad to exercise influence. Or, even if others ran, an Islamic extremist from Hamas could win. Clearly, the election of a Palestinian radical would stop the Bush process in its tracks. Arafat's re-election might well do the same unless Scenario 3 comes into play.

Scenario 3:

Arafat wins a free and fair election after implementing efforts to stop the terror. Faced with an Arafat who is democratically re-elected and who is, at least, trying to stop the terror a la Tenet and Mitchell, the U.S. changes its tune and accepts Arafat as the legitimate Palestinian leader. Israel does not, however, and we are back to square one. The three year clock does not advance, unless the United States decided to apply severe pressure on Israel - an unlikely scenario indeed in the light of current policy.

A possible compromise here, which might conceivably apply to scenarios 1 and 2, is to make Arafat a symbolic head of state, as has so often been discussed recently. But this scenario assumes the long-time Palestinian leader would be ready to accept such a role and would cease and desist from serious political activity. Arafat's entire career suggests just the opposite.

Scenario 4:

Continued lethal acts of terror, a major escalation of violence or an Israeli military error so erode the situation that it is impossible to wait for January elections before proceeding with negotiations. The Bush plan is overtaken by the immediate need to end the violence. Under these conditions the administration might be forced to move even more decidedly against the Palestinians. But we can also envision situations in which the Americans are forced to adopt the European view that security arrangements, i.e. anti-terror efforts, and political negotiations, must take place simultaneously. The Israeli government yields to public pressure and contacts are resumed with the Palestinian Authority (with or without Arafat, and in advance of elections). Or, on the other hand, the Israeli government goes so far in its reoccupation that the administration is forced to adjust its strategy. Or, the Israeli government does not yield to pressure, and the Bush administration is forced to confront Sharon despite Bush's best efforts to avoid a confrontation. In either case, the Bush speech turns out not to have been a watershed at all.

Implementation

Which scenario? Perhaps the most important factor in determining which scenario becomes reality is the precise steps the Bush administration now intends to take, the "roadmap" as the media calls it. The Bush speech lacked one. President Bush's strategy seems to be not to intervene unless and until the Palestinians transform their modus operandi and come up with new leaders. This is clearly a major break with the diplomacy of the past in which the U.S. played with the hand it was dealt.

The problem is that the parties may not wait for six months while elections are being arranged. The Israeli people want an immediate end to the violence and the Palestinian people seek to free themselves from the overwhelming burden of restrictions imposed by an Israeli army desperate to end attacks.

No one wants to wait for elections, which dooms each respective populace to continued suffering. And desperate people are not patient. The administration needs an implementation strategy for its intriguing vision, and it needs it soon. One thing is clear: if it doesn't follow up the President's speech with new acts of engagement, the address will soon be forgotten - a flashlight at the end of a nonexistent tunnel. This is a case where Act II is more important than Act I, and the Mideast audience is anxious for the curtain to open again on the administration's next steps.

Secretary of State Colin Powell is scheduled to meet in New York next week with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as well as with representatives of the European Union and Russia. The so-called Quartet will be addressing the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, particularly the vision set forth recently by President Bush for a change in Palestinian leadership and fundamental reform of the Palestinian Authority. This gathering comes on the heels of a meeting last week in London in which U.S. Assistant Secretary of State William Burns sought to line up support for Bush's initiative. Below is an analysis from the Washington Institute [www.washingtoninstitute.org] of the current Palestinian leadership's 100-day reform plan, which is an attempt to respond to the American proposal.

Next week we hope to devote the Middle East Briefing to an assessment of Secretary Powell's discussions.

As President George W. Bush was offering his vision for a post-Yasir Arafat Palestinian state two weeks ago, the Palestinian leader's cabinet was itself unveiling a "100-day plan" for reforming the Palestinian Authority (PA). This plan was clearly designed to both respond to popular demands to fix the PA's broken or stillborn institutions as well as steer the reform process down a nonthreatening, Arafat-controlled course. While it offers promising elements of change, the plan is only likely to strengthen the unacceptable status quo.

General Principles.

Approved by the PA cabinet on June 22 and presented to the public on June 26 -- one day after President Bush's speech -- the plan includes a general set of principles, a long list of operational objectives, and very few details. It is undoubtedly a work reflecting Arafat's approach to reform; preambular language says drafting was guided by three previous declarations by Arafat himself but, interestingly, not by the Reform Charter issued by the Palestinian Legislative Council or any of the reform documents circulating in Palestinian civil society. Of the fourteen principles enunciated, seven are directed to foreign governments and international donors, six to a domestic Palestinian audience, and one to "the peace forces inside Israel."

This breakdown underscores the fact that, from its outset, the plan seems to have been generated to address international concerns about the PA (and Arafat) no less than internal demands for reform. Indeed, none of these principles addresses "reform" per se, a concept which first receives mention 830 words into the 2,355 word text. As the first principle of the plan states: "The Palestinian Government sets out from one goal - in this plan as in all its programs - which is to foster the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and institutions in the face of Israeli occupation and all forms of terrorism that it exercises, settlements, establishment of separation zones, siege and other measures."

Objectives.

In the second section of the document, the plan outlines a set of operational goals under five headings: general, public security, finances, judiciary, and other. The wording of the text appears carefully calibrated to echo all the chords of the international reform chorus, but to do so gingerly and without full recognition of the depth of existing problems. For example, the first objective cited is to "reinforce the separation of powers," suggesting that such separation already exists and only needs modest enhancement. At the same time, the litany of objectives is presented as little more than a laundry list of items to be checked off by some auditing inspector, belying the extent of major, time-consuming structural change that would occur with the implementation of each item. For example, in the plan the PA commits itself to "create a modern and effective civil service"; to "endeavor to improve [the people's] standard of living"; and to "rebuild infrastructure." Done properly and professionally, these goals will take years to achieve.

Public Security.

In this important realm, the seven points enunciated only obliquely address the concerns of reformers or those critical of PA institutions that "traffic in terror," to use President Bush's phrase. Nowhere does the text refer to reducing the number of security services, shrinking the size of the security apparatus, reining in unlawful or extragovernmental militias, or confiscating illegal weapons or weaponsmaking factories. According to the plan, the Ministry of Interior will be "restructured," "modernized," and put in charge of preventive security, the police, and civil defense, but not, by implication, the Presidential Guard - members of which have also been "compromised by terror." While the plan promises "the utmost attention to the need of the population for safety, order and respect for the law," it offers no suggestion on how to do this. Yet it did recognize two key aspects of the security problems plaguing the PA: "the negative phenomena arising from a lack of discipline within the security services" and the need to "reinforce loyalty to the Authority . . . as a manifestation of loyalty to the country," suggesting that too many security officers split their loyalty to groups like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. No mention was made, however, of any practical measures to be taken against these or similar groups.

Finances,Judiciary, and "Other."

The ten objectives listed in the financial section are the most straightforward, addressing the need to unify national accounts (i.e., no more private accounts for custom duties or foreign grants); establish a national investment fund (i.e., no more monopolies held by Arafat cronies); create a professional auditing system; and budget expenditures on a transparent and predictable basis. Even here, the plan only promises the prospect of reform, as virtually all these commitments are couched in vague, open-ended terms, such as "develop the process of preparing the general budget"; "develop internal auditing"; "enhance the independence of the Office of the Auditor General"; and "start working on preparing the budget."

In the judicial section, the emphasis is on personnel and the physical plant, less on the operations of the judicial system itself. The main commitment concerns the "appointment of the required number of judges and the building of courthouses, offices of district attorneys . . . and modern prisons." The text does not discuss the role that either the reinvigorated judiciary or the legislative council would play in the "reinforced" balance of powers system envisioned herein.

>As for "other" objectives, they run the gamut from the universal (i.e., "to reinforce national, patriotic, religious, ethical, and humanistic values") to the esoteric (i.e., to deal with "the illicit transport and burial in Palestinian territory of toxic wastes by Israel.") On the positive side, this section includes an interesting reference to "renouncing fanaticism in the educational curricula," which is an important admission of an existing problem. On the negative side, the text also promises closer government control over the media, couched in terms of better "public administration and efficiency." The Next 100 Days. Part III of the proposal is a thirteen-step plan for implementing these objectives over the next three months. Through a series of presidential decrees, administrative actions, legislative submissions, and government orders to ministries, security forces, and regional governors, the PA cabinet committed itself and the ra'is to begin to carry out its commitment to reform. Some are very specific, such as the promise to gazette the Basic Law by July 15; others are amorphous, such as the commitment to "start implementing measures" - not further defined - that separate powers immediately.

" Perhaps of greatest concern to the international community is the speed with which the PA says it wants to pursue elections, with "presidential and legislative elections" scheduled for no later than January 2003 and "municipal elections" no later than March 2003. If held according to this schedule, it is clear elections would occur well before any but the most superficial reforms will have been achieved. Not surprisingly, the document makes no mention of the obvious problem of the PA executive - i.e., Arafat and his cabinet - arranging these elections, rather than a neutral extragovernmental body outside Arafat's control.

Conclusion.

The very idea of a "100-day plan" for reform underscores the obstacles to real change. While it is essential to move the reform process as fast as possible to take advantage of the current "window of opportunity," it is nonsensical to believe that after nearly nine years of the PA, substantive reform of government can be achieved in just three months, as this document promises. This problem reflects, in microcosm, the paradox of pursuing reform with the existing Palestinian leadership and underscores the urgency of conditioning any U.S. support for a future political process on both the process of reform and the outcome of leadership change. One without the other cannot produce a PA that merits high-level U.S. engagement and assistance.

Robert Satloff is The Washington Institute's director of policy and strategic planning.

This week Secretary of State Colin Powell is meeting with leaders from the UN, EU and Russia. Following is an analysis by Robert Satloff, director of policy and strategic planning at The Washington Institute www.washingtoninstitute.org

In the most significant Bush administration pronouncement on Arab Israeli issues since President George W. Bush's landmark June 24 speech, Secretary of State Colin Powell joined with leaders from the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and Russia in issuing a "joint statement" on Middle East policy in New York yesterday. In characterizing the meeting of "Quartet" diplomats that produced the statement, much of today's media reportage highlighted the contrast between Secretary Powell's fealty to the president's security-first approach and the preference of the other Quartet members for pursuing security, political, and humanitarian objectives simultaneously. Yet, a close reading of the Quartet's statement shows a different trend -namely, a disquieting resurrection of pre-June 24 prescriptions for Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, as well as acquiescence by U.S. participants in subtle yet meaningful backtracking in key areas of policy.

Background

Over the past year, the Quartet has emerged as an active player in Arab Israeli diplomacy, variously complementing and substituting for unilateral U.S. involvement. The reasons for this emergence are many and varied. First, in the wake of September 11, both Washington and its Quartet partners saw management of (and possible resolution to) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as essential to damming the political floodwaters of the war on terror in the Muslim and Arab worlds; this urgency powered a natural urge to cooperate. Second, with the worsening of Israeli-Palestinian violence, the near-total cessation of contacts between the two sides, and the reluctance of Washington to pursue initiatives in such an inhospitable environment, the Bush administration looked to the Quartet to gain some "burden sharing" on an intractable issue and to secure additional avenues of engagement and influence with local parties. Third, at a time when the administration was pilloried for its alleged unilateralism (i.e., the "axis of evil" speech), the Quartet's multilateral cooperation provided a visible refutation of the Euro-critique of U.S. foreign policy. Fourth was an inside-the-Beltway rationale: for the State Department, highlighting the need to maintain Quartet cooperation on Arab-Israeli matters so as to gain chits for future Quartet cooperation on the administration's wider agenda (e.g., fighting terror, "regime change" in Iraq) has been an oft-cited tool in interagency debates over Middle East issues.

Of course, it is difficult to define with precision how much importance one should attach to "alliance politics" as a factor in determining U.S. Middle East policy (or overall foreign policy); indeed, the president seemed unperturbed about likely EU-UN-Russian reactions when he delivered his June 24 address. Nevertheless, the current investment in coordinating U.S. peace process policy with the Quartet is clearly uncharacteristic of U.S. Middle East diplomacy for most of the last quarter-century. Simply put, given the time and effort invested in Quartet diplomacy by the secretary of state, the fruit of these labors merits close attention.

From Madrid to New York

Yesterday's statement was the Quartet's second joint communique, following the Madrid Declaration issued on April 10, six days after President Bush's first Rose Garden address lambasting Arafat's "failed leadership." Just as that Madrid statement underscored important differences between the Quartet and the policy enunciated by the president just days earlier (see "The Bush Speech vs. the Powell Mission: Assessing Washington's Twin and Competing Middle East Policies," PolicyWatch no. 616, April 15, 2002), so too did yesterday's statement underscore important differences between the Quartet and the policy enunciated by the president in the Rose Garden three weeks ago. Indeed, the differences between the Quartet communique and the president's speech seem to far outweigh the differences allegedly cited between the secretary of state and his Quartet partners:

• In the opening paragraph of the Quartet statement, the group issued an unqualified reaffirmation of the original Madrid communique, "to which the Quartet remains fully committed." In fact, it is impossible to reconcile the Madrid declaration with the president's June 24 speech. Madrid was an Arafat-centric document, which repeatedly appealed to Arafat -- by name, as "the recognized, elected leader of the Palestinian people" -- to play a constructive role in various areas; however, with the June 24 speech, the United States entered the post-Arafat era. Similarly, Madrid called on Israel to "halt immediately its military operations," a policy at odds with the president's stated understanding of the need for active Israeli self-defense in the territories. Moreover, Madrid outlined a process of "immediate, parallel and accelerated movement toward near-term and tangible political progress," which runs counter to the "security first, diplomacy later" sequence articulated by the president.

• In the New York communique, the Quartet said that "implementation of an action plan [on Palestinian reform]...should lead to the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state." However, there is no reference to the fact that negotiations -- not just fulfillment of the "action plan" -- should be prerequisite to statehood. The only reference to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is much later in the statement, when the Quartet "reaffirms" the need for a "negotiated permanent settlement." In suggesting a distinction between the creation of a Palestinian state (which might occur without negotiation) and a final settlement (which requires negotiation) the Quartet vision contradicts President Bush's June 24 statement that "creation of a provisional state of Palestine ... could rise rapidly as its comes to terms with Israel, Egypt and Jordan on practical issues such as security."

• More important, the Quartet statement makes no mention at all of the idea of provisional statehood, or even the concept of a Palestinian state's provisional borders and powers. The idea of provisionalism -one of the two major policy innovations in Bush's June 24 speech, alongside his call for new Palestinian leadership -- was entirely absent from the New York statement.

• The New York declaration also calls on Israel to make conciliatory
  gestures that differ in substance and timing from the president's speech. For example, the Quartet stated that "frozen tax revenues should be released," noting that a "more transparent and accountable mechanism is being put into place." This call for immediate and unconditional release of funds without an already functioning auditing system differs from the president's statement that "Israel should release funds into honest and accountable hands." A similar, subtle shift in wording can be found in the Quartet's call on Israel to take "immediate measures" on security matters and to seek security improvement through "reciprocal steps," both of which reshuffled the sequence of responsibilities from what the president outlined last month.

• The New York statement also made no reference to three important aspects of the president's speech: the need for Arab states to stop the flow of material, financial, political, and ideological support to terrorist groups; the unmistakable warning to Damascus that the United States would only support peacemaking with "a Syria that supports peace and fights terror"; and the abject failure of the existing Palestinian leadership (which could have been cited by the Quartet without reference to Bush's specific call for new leadership). Indeed, by avoiding the issue of Palestinian leadership altogether, the Quartet provided no logical rationale for its heavy emphasis on the need for Palestinian reform. One without the other does not really make sense.

Conclusion

Despite President Bush's shot across the diplomatic bow on June 24, translating that vision of peacemaking into reality remains a daunting task. Although no one should have expected the Quartet to parrot the president's speech, the fact that its statement contradicts that speech in critical areas is a worrisome sign that disagreements on Middle East policy persist not only among America's allies, but within the administration itself.

This week Israeli forces killed Salah Shehade, commander of the operational wing of the terrorist organization Hamas. Regrettably, Palestinian civilians, including children, also died in the attack. According to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Israel will "investigate very clearly what went wrong and draw all the conclusions." He also stated that "What happened is really regrettable. It wasn't done intentionally. I think all of us feel sorry for the loss of life of innocent people, particularly children." Following are portions of an interview with Shehade posted on the Islam Online website on May 29, 2002 (www.islam-online.net) and excerpted and translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute (www.memri.org). Also included is background information on Shehade provided by the Israel Defense Forces (www.idf.il). Emphasis is added.

How to Choose a Martyr

Q: "How do you choose who will carry out a martyrdom operation?"

Shehade: "The choice is made according to four criteria: First, devout religious observance. Second, we verify that the young man complies with his parents' wishes and is loved by his family, and that his martyrdom will not [adversely] affect family life -- that is, he is not the head of the family and he has siblings, as we will not take an only child. Third, his ability to carry out the task assigned [to] him, and to understand its gravity; and fourth, his martyrdom should encourage others to carry out martyrdom operations and encourage Jihad in the hearts of people. We always prefer unmarried [men]...."

Seeking Martyrdom Shows Mental Health

Q: "How do you account for the stream of youths [coming] to join the ranks of perpetrators of martyrdom operations? And does this attest to [mental] health or to escape from the frustration and disappointment among the Palestinians?"

Shehade: "The stream of youths [who seek to] attain martyrdom shows [mental] health and the awareness of Palestinian society, and is not a mistake or an escape from a situation of despair or frustration. Many people come to Jihad, and they are willing to lay down their souls -- which is the most precious thing a man has. There is a vast difference between someone who sacrifices money or an offering and someone who sacrifices his soul for the sake of Allah to bring happiness to the nation, and to remove its torment and distress. Nevertheless, we cannot provide everyone with a martyrdom operation because the targets are limited and the enemy positions we want to reach are highly fortified. If some of the youths do not follow the military apparatus's instructions, and [set out on operations on their own] without being linked officially to this apparatus, this proves that the [entire] nation has become a nation of Jihad on the threshold of liberation, and that it rejects humiliation and submission."

How to Choose a Target

Q: "How does the military apparatus choose a target?"

Shehade: "We have surveillance groups whose role is to monitor Israeli and settler patrols and the movement of the enemy on the border. We utilize every breach we find in the enemy's security fence. Afterwards we define the target and the nature of the assault on it, whether it is a settlement, a military post, a military vehicle, or anything else. The target is filmed, and then [the video] is shown to a committee appointed by the General Staff of the Military Operations. After the target is approved, the martyrdom operation's perpetrator is trained... Then the operation is ready to go, after a group of experts approves the plan and determines the factors for its success or failure."

If We Kill an Israeli Child It Is Not Intentional

Q: "What about killing Israeli citizens?"

Shehade: "We do not target children, the elderly, and places of worship, although these places of worship incite to murdering Muslims. Similarly, we have not targeted schools, because we do not give orders to kill children. The same goes for hospitals, although this is easy for us, and attainable. We act according to the principles of Jihad to which we adhere. Our motto is: 'We are not fighting the Jews because they are Jews, but because they occupy our land. We are not fighting them because of their religion but because they have usurped our land. If we kill a child it is not intentional...'"

Salah Shehade - Portrait of a Hamas Leader Salah Shehade was one of the founders of Hamas and the commander of its military wing. He is directly responsible for hundreds of attacks committed against Israeli citizens and its security forces over the past two years. These have resulted in death and injury to large numbers of people. Quite simply, in recent years, Shehade had been the central figure in Hamas's organization. And, it is known that Shehade was planning further severe acts of terror. Israeli security officials have stated that Shehade was closely associated with most of the terrorist activities in the Gaza area, whether in planning them himself or in their approval. To take just two examples of these wanton acts: the killing of 4 soldiers at the IDF posting nicknamed "Africa" (9 January 2002) and the slaughter of 5 high school students at Atzmona (7 March 2002).... ...Shehade mobilised the Hamas leaders in the West Bank, as well being a main link with Hamas officials' abroad. And it was Shehade who led the efforts to manufacture rockets with the aim of directing them at the heart of Israel. He personally oversaw the production and purchase of armaments. Over the course of the past two years, Israeli authorities made dozens of requests to the Palestinian Authority to act against Shehade's activities. Unfortunately, the Palestinian Authority did not lift a finger against him, and permitted him as well as other Hamas operatives to act freely....

Background:

Born in 1953 in Jaffa, Salah Shehade began his Islamist activities in the 1980's as a student at the Islamist University in Gaza. ...In 1984, Israeli security forces arrested him due to his involvement in hostile activities against Israel. After he was released from prison in 1986, he joined forces with Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Together, they decided to create a secret "military apparatus" called the "Palestinian Jihad Fighters" (Almuj'yhadin Al-Palestinin) which formed the basis for the establishment of Hamas and its military wing Iz Adin al-kassam in December 1987. In 1988 Salah Shehade was re-arrested by Israeli authorities and was accused of establishing a terror cell, training terrorists in weapons-use and giving orders to carry out terror attacks. After his release from an Israeli prison in 2000, Shehade returned to his position as the commander of the military wing of Hamas, which carried out thousands of terror attacks, including dozens of suicide attacks against Israeli targets in recent years. Salah Shehade's terror activities: ...For the past two years, Shehade has been planning, developing and cultivating the terrorist infrastructure for Hamas' military wing, Iz Adin al-kassam. He stood behind the creation of the Hamas field-command, which operated in different areas. He was instrumental behind Hamas arming itself with advanced weapons, such as anti-tank missiles, made locally and smuggled illegally into the Palestinian Territories. Additionally, he was responsible for collecting money from Islamic organizations all over the world in order to support the terrorist activities of Hamas. Shehade saw all of "historic Palestine" as holy Islamic territory, which had a religious obligation to be freed completely and immediately from Jews. Based on this opinion, he was opposed to all negotiations with Israel, even those that would lead to a Palestinian state on only part of "historic Palestine". Shehade carried the banner of the Islamic extremists who saw the Jihad (Islamic war against non-believers) as the preferred way to achieve political objectives. The Jihad is seen as the centerpiece of this strategy, which includes uncompromising armed struggle that would permit a reconquering of Palestine. In this framework, he saw that suicide attacks were the highest expression of the Jihad, and felt that all Israelis, including civilians, are legitimate targets in the "struggle"....

...[Shehade] saw it as a mark of honor for Palestinian youths, willing to volunteer for suicide attacks. He supported them fully in this path, and even established a "youth wing" within Hamas that provided military education and training for youths preparing for suicide missions. Shehade also provided the principles for the religious approval for using women and young girls as suicide terrorists....

On June 27, 2002, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy held a special full-day seminar on reforming the Palestinian Authority (PA). Among the seminar's participants were Ziad Abu Amr, chairman of the Political Committee of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC); Dr. Abu Libdeh, director of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and professor at Bir Zeit University; and Dr. Shikaki, associate professor of political science at Bir Zeit University and director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah.

It is encouraging to hear voices for change from leaders in the Palestinian community. Whether those voices will be successful remains to be seen. Following are selected sections of the June 27th presentations. For additional excerpts, visit www.washingtoninstitute.org

THE NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
ZIAD ABU AMR

Citing a recent speech given by Yasir Arafat to the PLC on the importance of reform, Abu Amr said, "For the first time, he acknowledged that there were mistakes, but he takes responsibility, something I personally did not like because this meant from the very start, suppressing the process of accountability and actual reform. The idea of the president was, 'Okay, there were mistakes. We close the files. We start afresh.' That was not acceptable."

PLC Response

"We asked for a change of government. We asked [Arafat] to sign the Basic Law. The Basic Law was not then signed, and we asked him to sign all pending laws, and not only to sign laws, but to make sure that these laws are implemented because signing laws is one thing. Implementing them and respecting them is another. And all along, we have been having a problem of not implementing laws or respecting the rule of law.

"With regard to elections, the president did not issue a decree . . . with specific dates, and we need specific dates, and we need a decree because there is a great deal of work that needs to be done, if the elections are to be conducted in January. Time is running out."

Broadening Palestinian Electoral Participation

"... In order to allow for the formation of parliamentary blocs, we need to open the system and allow for the participation and representation of political groups who have so far been excluded... "This is bound to create a meaningful opposition, and if we have meaningful opposition, then the president will no longer be able to co-opt the Council the way he has been able to do all along.

Changing the Cabinet

"Also, how do you do reform without accountability? In eight years since the establishment of the PA, not one single Palestinian senior official was questioned or held accountable, or tried for failures, misdoings, abuse of public funds, public office -- you name it, violations of the law. And we demanded that this time, we want accountability. We are not going to let people come and become new ministers or accept the new government without exercising some accountability.

PALESTINIAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM
HASSAN ABU LIBDEH

Why Reform?

"While Palestinians should embark on a reform process guarded by Palestinian interests and internal conditions, Israel, with all the might and influence it has on the country, may play a determining role in the Palestinian infrastructure, good governance, and alter the current mode of governance. With current realities at hand, it is only logical to ask whether a political, social, and security situation on the ground permits for a genuine reform agenda in the absence of a roadmap to Palestinian independence.

"On the other hand, reform should be embarked upon as the only means for survival of Palestinian aspirations. The apparent conditioning of resumption in the peace process on reform and changes of leadership in the PA will likely backfire and lead to further deterioration on the ground. For a typical Palestinian, reform should be seen as the most proper means for empowerment and enhancing personal security and the standard of living -- not as a response to conditions set by external pressure. The suggested framework for reform will have to be in response to internal needs, while taking into consideration commitments set out by the interim agreement with Israel. . . ."

Political Reform

"One of the major weaknesses of the Palestinian cabinet is the fact that it does not meet. They meet every week for three hours, but they never discuss issues relating to governance and the work of the government. There is a great mix-up between the role of the cabinet as overlooking the interests of the people, and the program of development . . . and the fact that this cabinet deals with issues relating to the political context of the relationship with Israel and negotiations . . . and the government is left without any directions or guidance to follow.

"A primary step in the reform process should be a genuine and comprehensive review of government conduct, perceived mandates, and programs in relation to needs and potentials, efficiency, track records, the ability to respond to needs, and service orientation. The PA should also work toward following up on ratified laws in order to make them applicable, and this is extremely important. It is not enough for the president to sign laws. It is not really enough for the Legislative Council to ratify laws. Ratifying and signing them does not mean application of these laws.

"There is a culture of not applying laws in [Palestine]. Many of the laws that have been ratified and signed are still sitting there, not being practiced. And not only the basic law -- we are speaking of the most recent, just before the intifada -- the labor law was ratified, but it was never put into application. So, signing laws is not enough in this regard. . . ."

How to Advance Reforms

"In the meantime, the PA has to launch a rigorous campaign within the Palestinian public in support of peaceful means of expression. I think one of our problems is that up to this point, officially, the PA has not led in the efforts of convincing the public, or leading the public, influencing the public opinion that we have agreements, and probably some activities could take place, but they have to be through peaceful means. The PA is neutral in this regard . . .

THE RATIONALE FOR PALESTINIAN REFORM
KHALIL SHIKAKI

Why Do Palestinians Need Reform?

"First and foremost, every political system needs legitimacy, and the search for legitimacy has been one that every Palestinian, at one time or another, wanted to address. . . . If we agree on the nature of the legitimacy that we would like to use as a source for governance, then it becomes easier to determine what kind of priorities we need. Should that source of legitimacy be the PLO legacy? Or should it be the will of the people and elections, statebuilding in the normal sense, like any other country? Palestinians have not yet made that choice. . .

Old Guard vs. Young Guard

"We need strong institutions because we want to build our economy. We've failed to do that. We want to provide security, for us and the Israelis. We've failed to do that. We want [a] strong judiciary so that we can have rule of law, so that business can come and invest. We've failed to do that. . . . The intifada, as I believe, weakened tremendously . . . and marginalized the old guard and has led to the creation of a new leadership. It's a de facto leadership. The next elections, I believe, will basically institute this change. The old guard will be out, and the new guard will be in."