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JCRC Middle East Briefings

Deputy Special Middle East Coordinator, U.S. Department of State Dr. Aaron David Miller gave the following briefing on Friday, March 2, 2001. He has served as an advisor in the State Department under four presidents and five secretaries of state.

In his opening remarks, Dr. Miller noted that Arabs and Israelis are now experiencing one of the most extraordinary and difficult times in his tenure at the State Department. It is an unpredictable, traumatic period, the full impact of which cannot be felt immediately. In July, at Camp David, the Israelis and Palestinians were involved in remarkable conversations with the President of the United States, which transformed the negotiating landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Three months later, Israelis and Palestinians were involved in the worst violent confrontation since Oslo. Dr. Miller commented on the following six observations about the nature and character of the Middle East Peace Process:

1. The Arab-Israeli conflict is not a morality play. It is not a battle of good v. evil or the forces of light v. darkness. Its strategic, political, and demographic factors make it one of the most complicated conflicts of this century. If we view it any other way, we risk credibility and all possibility of resolution.

All agreements that have been reached between the Arabs and Israelis have been based on finding a balance between mutual needs and requirements - the essential point of departure for any agreement. A good agreement must reflect the needs of both sides if it is to last.

2. This conflict will only be resolved in the way it has evolved - in phases over time. It will take time to test intentions, change attitudes, and absorb the shocks and traumas that have tragically become part of the process.

3. Still, the process has extraordinary resiliency. Who would have believed that seven years after Oslo we would have seen Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin assassinated by an Israeli, the killings in Hebron by Baruch Goldstein, Palestinian suicide terror attacks against Israelis, and two agreements between Yasser Arafat and a Likud Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu?

Why such resiliency? Because sometime in the last ten to fifteen years a decision was made. The Israelis, Palestinians, and key Arab states decided to try and find an alternative to the ongoing, protracted conflict. Their willingness to test this decision over time is extraordinarily remarkable and reflects the self-interest of those in the Middle East.

4. Whether the Oslo process is dead or alive is irrelevant. The legacy of Oslo has permanently affected the process. In September 1993, the Israelis and Palestinians engaged in mutual recognition. This changed the basis of the conflict from a conflict over existence which could never be resolved to a conflict over politics which could. That change is irreversible. Israel and the Palestinians are now partners. Their relationship is now uneasy and adversarial, but they are partners. Prime Ministers Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu and Barak all understood that there would not be a military solution to the conflict, so there must be a political solution.

Israelis and Palestinians now face the same issue. Their decisions will be shaped by two things which cannot be changed: common history and common geography. Neither Israelis nor Palestinians have an alternative. Their proximity to one another means there will never be a status quo. There will be protracted violence, which neither side wants, or accommodation that could one day produce a relationship based on mutual tolerance and respect for security and political aspirations.

5. Changing the situation on the ground will require efforts by both sides. It is not a question of moral symmetry. Clearly the violence must stop. Both Palestinians and Israelis have a responsibility to help break the cycle of action and reaction. Palestinians need to stop orchestrating violence and inciting to violence. Israelis need to remove restrictions on economic life and movement which cause suffering and hardship to thousands of Palestinians.

6. American policy derives from actions and decisions taken by Arabs and Israelis. Over the years, the U.S. has played many roles: to facilitate, mediate, broker and support peace and to reduce the risks that go along with making decisions about peace, particularly for Israel, with whom we have such a close tie. But those decisions about peace and war are left to the Arabs and Israelis. They must decide whether they will have a future of unending war and violence or one of accommodation, some trust, and hopefully a real peace.

The following is excerpted from an assessment by David Makovsky, senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

While the main purpose of Secretary of State Colin Powell's first foray into the Middle East was to discuss Iraq, he also visited Israel and the Palestinian Authority and injected a dose of what some would call "evenhandedness" - giving each both something to be pleased about and something to be unnerved about.

Powell did not please Israelis completely as he did not specifically endorse Israel's policy of closures to handle the intifada, and he used Palestinian terminology in calling for a "lifting of the siege."… He did not assign blame for the ongoing violence, nor did he distinguish between the types of killing. Israel says there is a difference between, on the one hand, selectively targeting Hamas … activists who are responsible for killing innocent civilians and, on the other hand, the actions of a Palestinian bus driver who plowed into a bus stop full of unsuspecting travelers. Israeli officials privately - so far not publicly, in order not to offend Powell - term such an approach of failing to distinguish between these acts as one of moral equivalence. … Palestinians could not be happy that Powell accepted Israeli sequencing, in the peace process, whereby he declared a reduction of violence was a precondition for resumption of peace negotiations. … Taken together, these two principles could show the embryonic form of the Bush administration's policy on the peace process: siding with the Palestinians on economic - and perhaps even symbolic - matters, while siding with Israel on the proper context of diplomacy. Some of the main points of the Powell visit include:

Evenhandedness

...Powell consistently bemoaned the ongoing violence, but never went beyond his call for both sides to avoid an "escalation of violence." The Palestinians view this as a victory, which they hope represents a departure from the policies of the Clinton administration, which they have called "one-sided." Furthermore, Powell made clear that he was not happy with Israel's closure policy of the territories...At his joint press conference with Chairman Yasir Arafat, Powell said, "I also want to express my deep concern for the dire economic situation that everyday Palestinians must bear...We discussed how it is necessary to lift the siege as soon as possible so that economic activity can begin again in the region."...

Lowering Violence as a Precondition for Negotiations

...Powell made clear in blunt remarks that he accepts Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's condition that peace talks must be preceded by Palestinian efforts to quell intifada violence...the Palestinians have actively opposed any conditionality between halting violence and resuming peace talks. The Palestinians have also insisted that talks must resume where they left off with the Clinton administration...Powell indicated in an interview with CNN at the Clinton ideas left with Clinton. Informed sources report that Powell privately told Israeli officials that while Clinton's proposals cannot be the starting point for negotiations, it is also true that the two sides cannot go back to "zero." He also said that the ideas for moving the negotiations forward need to come from the region, not from the United States...

Powell Not Seeking to Release PA Funds

While there is no doubt that Powell favors an easing of economic conditions in the Palestinian territories, at the same time, Powell told reporters that he did not ask Sharon to release an estimated $57 million in Palestinian tax revenues since Sharon has made clear that he does not want to release the sum so long as there is a "rising spiral of violence." … While some commentators have focused on the taxes Israel needs to transfer to the PA, it should also be noted that the revenue involved in this transfer is largely a function of the number of Palestinian workers in Israel, and this number has dropped dramatically during the intifada.

Powell's Assessments of Sharon and Arafat

In assessing Sharon, Powell suggested he was pleasantly surprised. He declared, "I found [Sharon] very reflective, very thoughtful, very engaged on the issues." He added, "the prime minister-elect understands … that he has taken upon his shoulders great responsibility, not only for the people of Israel but the people of the region." When asked if he thought Arafat was as "open-minded," Powell declared, "Arafat held to positions he has held to all along. The conversation was brisk on a number of occasions. We had a good discussion."

Americans Care about the Mideast

The fact that Powell's first trip abroad was to the Middle East reflects deeper American public concern with the Middle East … a poll taken by Gallup [in February] suggests that 83 percent (as opposed to 77 percent last July) of Americans believe that "development of a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian situation" should be an American foreign policy priority. In the same poll, 63 percent of Americans have a favorable view of Israel, which is almost triple the amount of support that Americans have for the Palestinian Authority, 22 percent. … According to Gallup poll taken [in February], American sympathies run with Israel rather than the Palestinians by a margin of 51 to 16, which is wider than the 41 to 11 margin from a poll taken in mid-October.

Between January 25 and February 17, 2001, Penn, Schoen & Berland, Inc. and First International Resources, Inc. conducted a survey commissioned by the United Jewish Communities, the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, and the Conference of Presidents. A national sample of 1,400 Americans were interviewed, including 600 general public, 200 with high income and educational levels ("elites"), 400 American Jews, and 250 influential Americans (journalists, legislators, businessmen, etc.)

Following are some of the major findings:

• 37% of Americans say that the Middle East and the current Israeli-Palestinian situation is the most important foreign policy problem the new administration faces.

• 75% of Americans say they are following the news from the Middle East very closely or somewhat closely.

• Over 66% of Americans and 75% of "elites" say they are favorable towards Israel.

• Only 18% of Americans have a favorable attitude toward the Palestinian Authority.

• 28% view Chairman Arafat favorably, while 54% of the general public and 64% of "elites" view him unfavorably.

• More than 80% of the general population and "elites" agree that the U.S. and Israel have a special relationship because the two countries share many common values, including a commitment to freedom and democracy. Nearly 66% of Americans believe the U.S. should assist in the defense of Israel should it be necessary.

• By almost a 5-to-1 margin, all four groups said they are significantly more supportive of Israeli positions in the peace process than the Palestinian position.

• More than 66% of the general public - and 48% of American Jews - believe the Palestinians deserve a sovereign state.

• Americans are more likely to blame the Palestinians than Israel for the current violence in the Middle East by a 3-to-1 margin. 60% of Americans believe Chairman Arafat has not changed his ways and still wants to push the Jews out of Israel. A majority of Americans believe that the Palestinians' ultimate goal is the destruction of Israel. Only 33% of the general public, 22% of "elites" and 22% of influential Americans support the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel. A majority of Americans believe that the Palestinians initiate violence in the West Bank and Gaza by throwing stones or shooting Israeli soldiers. Only 7% of the general public and 3% of "elites" say that Israeli soldiers start the violence by shooting at the Palestinians. Nearly 75% of all four groups believe that Israel is very serious or somewhat serious about achieving peace. Less than 50% of the general public, "elites" and American Jews believe the same about the Palestinian Authority. 58% of influential Americans believe the PA is very serious or somewhat serious.

• 78% of Americans say the U.S. should continue to play a strong role in mediating the conflict.

• Only 22% of the general public and 36% of "elites" are aware that Israel has given part of the West Bank and Gaza back to the Palestinians. Even fewer Americans are aware of the amount of land now under Palestinian control. A slim majority of Americans believe that Israel should agree to divide Jerusalem with the Palestinians. Among American Jews, 61% believe Jerusalem should remain the undivided capital of Israel.

• 18% of Americans support dismantling of the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and 38% support dismantling some of them. Over 50% of the Jewish population supports the dismantling of some settlements.

Last October, then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat met in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in an effort to end the violence which began in late September. As a result, and at the request of Barak and Arafat, then-U.S. President Bill Clinton, in cooperation with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, established the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (since referred to as The Mitchell Committee for its chairman, former U.S. Senator George Mitchell) to provide an objective study of the violence in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The Committee was asked to provide an assessment of what has happened, why, and how to prevent its recurrence. Israel submitted an opening statement to the Committee on December 29, 2000, and a second statement on March 20, 2001. The full text of these documents may be viewed on Israel's Foreign Ministry web site at http://www.israel.org

Israel's Opening Statement

In its opening statement, Israel characterized the Palestinian violence as a war. It also expressed the sense of betrayal Israelis felt - that just when the Israelis and Palestinians seemed to be on the verge of peace, the Palestinians began a "sustained and orchestrated campaign of attacks against Israeli civilians and armed forces." The report quotes a member of the Palestinian Authority, Abu Ali Mustafa, who said, on July 23, 2000 (even before the failure of Camp David), "The issues of Jerusalem, the refugees, and sovereignty will be decided on the ground and not in negotiations. At this point it is important to prepare Palestinian society for the next step because we will undoubtedly find ourselves in confrontation with Israel in order to create new facts on the ground. ... I believe that the situation in the future will be more violent than the Intifada."

Israel contends that the violence is "the result of the failure, and indeed refusal, of the PLO and the [PA] to comply with their essential responsibilities" to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel and Israelis. This is a direct violation of Palestinian commitments to Israel in the peace process. Israel views the violence as a calculated attempt on the part of the Palestinians to gain international sympathy in the wake of the international community's perception that the Palestinians were responsible for the failure of Camp David. The report goes on to address such issues as the use of children, violence against Israeli civilians, and incitement on the part of the Palestinians. Israel defends its positions, purporting that traditional riot control techniques are inadequate for containing live-fire confrontations. The report also puts forth proposals for preventing further violence by full implementation and strengthening of existing agreements.

Israel's Second Statement

Israel's second report to the Committee was submitted "because Israel believes that the record of exchanges before the Committee should be complete and that the nature and content of the Palestinian submissions should not go unanswered." The Palestinians, Israel contests, "want a right to attack, while denying Israel a right to defend. They call for Israeli restraint, but accept no limits themselves. They talk of a reestablishment of trust but fail to condemn attacks." The report is a response to the Palestinians' second submission, which Israel claims is a "gross distortion" of events. The Palestinian report leaves out, the Israeli report contends, any comment on "attacks on Israeli civilians, about on-going incitement to hatred and violence, about the release of terrorist detainees, about the calculated exploitation of children, illegal use of weapon, the destruction of Jewish Holy Sites...." The Israeli submission states that, through its submissions, the Palestinians show the violence against Israel as "somehow explicable, understandable, legitimate," but includes nothing about ending the violence. The report goes on to refute specific claims that the IDF uses excessive force in responding to the violence and respond to allegations of collective punishment. The submission also reiterates that Palestinian recommendations do not address an end to the violence nor indicate a willingness to end attacks on Israeli civilians and military personnel.

Next Steps

The Mitchell Committee completed its investigative work in Israel and left the country on Sunday, March 25th. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon met with the members of the Committee before they left. While the members promised to make a balanced report, Sharon told them that "a balanced report would be a prize for the aggressor." Sharon's remarks were in response to Senator Mitchell's comment that the committee's mandate was not to judge, but rather to determine what happened and recommend how new outbreaks of violence can be avoided. Just before the meeting, Sharon told Israel Radio that "agreeing to such a committee is a historic mistake because no one has the right, no one, to put Israel on trial before the world." According to The New York Times, Israel's contention has been that "since the cease-fire agreement was never honored, the committee's original assignment - a retrospective examination of the month of violence up to the point when they reached the accord - was no longer valid."

On April 7, Jews around the world will gather with family and friends to celebrate Passover - the festival of freedom.

In the United States, we celebrate many freedoms - freedom from oppression, freedom of religion, freedom to live our lives as we wish. And freedom from fear.

Our Israeli brothers and sisters are not so fortunate this year. The ongoing violence, which began around Rosh Hashana, has taken away their sense of safety and security.

Israelis, and Jews around the world, want peace. As we celebrate our freedom, let us remember that until there is peace between Israel and her neighbors, we will not truly be free.

Leaders of the international Jewish community have suggested that every Jewish household set an extra place at their Seder table in honor of our POWs, MIAs and others caught in the conflict. And please consider inserting the following prayers into your Seder:

Psalm 122 - A Prayer For The Peace Of Jerusalem

I rejoiced when they said to me,
"We are going to the House of the Lord."
Our feet stood inside your gates, O Jerusalem,
Jerusalem built up, a city knit together,
to which tribes would make pilgrimage,
the tribes of the Lord,
- as was enjoined upon Israel-
to praise the name of the Lord.
There the thrones of judgment stood,
thrones of the house of David.
Pray for the well-being of Jerusalem;
"May those who love you be at peace.
May there be well-being within your ramparts,
peace in your citadels.
For the sake of my kin and friends,
I pray for your well-being;
for the sake of the house of the Lord our God,
I seek your good.

Prayer for the safe return of Israel's POWs and MIAs

May He who blessed our fathers, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Joseph, Moses and Aaron, David and Solomon bless, guard and protect our prisoners of war and IDF soldiers missing in action, including: Ron son of Batya and Moshe Arad, Zachariah Shlomo son of Miriam and Yona Baumel, Yekutiel Yehuda Nahman son of Sara and Yoseph Katz, Zvi son of Pnina and Abraham Feldman, Omer son of Hadra and Kassem Suewed, Binyamin son of Edna and Chaim Avraham, Adiel son of Zipora and Yitzhak Avitan, Elchanan son of Rivka and Yehuda Tannenbaum, and our brothers who are imprisoned in Iran, among all our brothers, who belong to the Jewish people and are in distress and being held captive for the sake of this community which prays on their behalf.

May God be filled with mercy for them, and bring them out of darkness and the shadow of death, may He release their bonds and save them from anguish, and return them speedily to their families and may salvation come swiftly. "May they thank the Lord for His kindness and wonders for the human race." And may the words of the Bible be fulfilled, as it is written: "Those redeemed by God will return and arrive at Zion with glad song and eternal gladness on their heads; joy and gladness shall they attain, and sorrow and misery shall flee, and let us say Amen."

The State Department recently submitted to Congress its semi-annual report on Palestinian compliance with the Oslo Accords. The report, submitted in accordance with the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989 (PLOCCA), describes the statements and actions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) from June 16, 2000 to December 15, 2000. In describing the activities of PLO-affiliated groups such as the Tanzim and the Palestinian police force, the report validates Israeli accusations of their behavior.

Excerpts Of The Report
Report Pursuant to Title VIII of Public Law 101-246 Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990-91, As Amended

Incidents of Violence/Terrorism. ...Until September 28 the number of terrorist incidents and casualties was less than that reported to Congress in the previous PLOCCA report, and security cooperation was generally good...In an August 24, 2000 interview with Israel television's Arabic Service, Muhammad Dahlan, head of the Preventive Security Organization in Gaza, stated that "...we do not want, wish, nor hope that any confrontations will occur between us and Israel, because the two sides will lose in this confrontation." He also stated, "We pledged to control the security situation as part of our political commitments."...The period since September 28, 2000 was marked by sustained violence and a near complete breakdown in security cooperation between the two parties...While it is difficult to determine whom, if anyone, planned specific instances of anti-Israeli violence, public statements by leaders of the Tanzim clearly encouraged violence...

PLO Renunciation of Terrorism. The Palestinian Authority did not change its policy opposing terrorism during this reporting period. That said, individual members of the PA security services or groups associated with Fatah instigated and participated in anti-Israeli violence. It is not clear if Chairman Arafat or other high level PA officials sanctioned such actions.

Security Matters. ...During the period covered by this report elements of Fatah, a PLO faction, and members of the PA's security forces instigated and participated in anti-Israeli violence. We have no indication that any of these elements of PA security officials have been disciplined. It is not clear, however, whether they acted with the approval of the PA or PLO senior leadership...Even before the outbreak of violence there were grounds for concern over the activities of some Fatah elements. For example, Fatah and PA sponsored "summer camps" where up to 30,000 Palestinian youngsters were taught how to handle weapons and guerrilla warfare tactics by Tanzim instructors...During the reporting period there were also indications that members of the PA security forces participated in the violence...In an October 17, 2000 interview with the Voice of Palestine a PSO leader was asked about illegal weapons. He said, "We view these weapons as legal. They are used to defend the Palestinian people...Barak commits a big mistake if he thinks we will stop the Fatah members and call them to account."...To our knowledge there has been no effort by the senior PA or PLO leadership to discipline elements of the Tanzim or the security forces that have participated in attacks on Israelis...During the reporting period a large number of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad prisoners were released from PA jails...

PLO Charter. Under the Wye River Memorandum of October 23, 1998, the Palestinians obligated themselves to...reaffirm the...nullification of the PLO Charter provisions that are inconsistent with the letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel on September 9-10, 1993...The Government of Israel has stated that the Palestinians have met their obligations concerning the revision of the PLO charter.

Arab League Boycott of Israel. As previously reported the PLO reiterated its stand against the Arab boycott of Israel when it signed the September 28, 1995, Joint Declaration of the Washington Summit which called...for an end to the boycott as soon as possible...That remains the Palestinian position on the Arab boycott. Some PA officials...have called for a boycott, but the PA has not taken any such decision nor has the PA's senior leadership come out in favor of it.

Status of the PLO Office. The State Department's Office of Foreign Missions designated the PLO office in Washington a "foreign mission"...The PLO office and personnel are not accorded diplomatic status, privileges or immunities. The office may not portray itself as a diplomatic mission or embassy, but may portray itself as representing the PLO...In October, 2000, President Clinton again exercised his authority to permit the PLO office to remain open for an additional six months...

Assistance to the Palestinians. The United States has continued to work with the international donor community to meet the development needs of the Palestinians....The United States does not provide funds to the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian Council, PLO, or to any international funds established to contribute money directly to those entities. All U.S. assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is provided through contractors or non-governmental organizations hired to carry out specific assistance projects. There have been no credible reports to indicate that other U.S. assistance projects have been used for other than their intended purposes...

Other Issues. ...One of the obstacles to a stronger legislative role in PA governance is the weakness of the Council as an institution; thus, an important component of USAID's Democracy and Governance program is aimed at strengthening the Council and enhancing its ability to act as a legislative body...There has been no measurable progress toward long-delayed municipal elections during the reporting period...

Congressional Testimony. Ambassador Edward Walker, acting asst. secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs testified before a Congressional subcommittee that "...we've seen absolutely no response from Arafat to our urgings to him to help bring the violence to a stop. He has made no statements that would indicate that he is opposed to the violence or that he even wants to see it stop. In fact, he has called for the continuation of the intifada." In response to a question about whether it could be concluded that it was a tactic to resume the intifada after the Camp David Summit, Walker replied, "They [PA officials] said as much, and so I think a reasonable person could assume [that]."

In May 2000, 18 years after invading southern Lebanon, Israeli troops withdrew to the internationally-recognized Israel-Lebanon border. One year later, Hizbullah, supported by Iran and Syria, continues to launch deadly rocket attacks into northern Israel. The following is a background article reprinted from the Jerusalem Post, April 17, 2001.

Syria's presence in the Land of the Cedars
Background by David Rudge

Syria's presence in Lebanon has been a fact of life for the mixed Moslem Shi'ites and Sunnis and the minority Christian and Druse communities in the Land of the Cedars since 1976.

Lebanon's civil war, which would last until 1990, had been raging then for a year.

The request for military assistance was made by the Christians, who were then the ruling power in the government but faced a crushing defeat at the hands of Moslem and leftist militias.

Added to this was the presence of the Palestinians, who after being expelled, battered and bleeding, from Jordan in September 1970, managed to reorganize in refugee camps throughout Lebanon and particularly in the south. By the time the civil war erupted, the PLO and its proxies had established a power base which they gradually extended outside the camps, ultimately forming a state within a state.

Syrian forces rolled into Lebanon, ostensibly to help quell the fighting and restore order that would keep the Christian leadership in power and beholden to Damascus. For then president Hafez Assad, it was a heaven-sent opportunity to stamp control over Lebanon, which many in his regime regarded as being a part of "Greater Syria." The fighting, however, rumbled on despite numerous ceasefire efforts, accords, and double-dealing, while in the south, Palestinian gunmen stepped up their attacks on northern Israel.

Israel's decision to retaliate and destroy the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure in south Lebanon, with what started out in June 1982 as Operation Peace for Galilee and later became known as the Lebanon War, changed the whole picture dramatically.

The Palestinians were expelled but only after the fighting had reached the outskirts of Beirut and involved IDF forces in fierce clashes with the Syrians, mainly in the Bekaa Valley.

Attempts to forge a peace accord or at least a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon were squashed by the Syrians and three years after the invasion, Israel withdrew to an expanded security zone in south Lebanon.

The civil war continued [to rage] on, with former allies changing sides and fighting one another in the changing circumstances, but throughout it all Syrian troops remained in place, leaving Damascus the main power broker.

Lebanon's internecine fighting ended in 1990, a decade before Israel pulled all its forces out of the region, with the signing of what was known at the time as the Syrian-sponsored Taif accord. It was agreed that all the mini armies which had fought in the war would lay down their arms and disband. An exception was made for Hizbullah, which was allowed to retain its military wing in order to "lead the resistance against the continued Zionist occupation" of the security zone.

The Taif accord called for Syrian troops to be redeployed from Beirut to the Bekaa Valley region by 1992 following the successful implementation of the agreements, without setting a final date for a total pullout. Syria has reduced its visible presence in the Lebanese capital but its security officials are still very much around.

UN Security Council resolution 520, passed after Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, also calls for the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Despite this, Syria retains an estimated 30,000 troops in Lebanon and around one million Syrian civilians earn a living in the Land of the Cedars, in addition to all the economic benefits reaped by the regime in Damascus.

Since last September, Cardinal Nasrallah Sfeir, the patriarch of Lebanon's Maronite Catholic Church, has been spearheading a peaceful campaign against Syrian political and military control of Lebanon.

Druse warlord Walid Jumblatt has also added his voice to those demanding the restoration of Lebanon's national sovereignty.

Hizbullah is leading the campaign in favour of Syria's role and its continued presence in Lebanon.

Last week, Egypt and Jordan proposed a plan to end the violence between Israel and the Palestinians and restart negotiations. The proposal was originally drafted by Saeb Erekat, chief negotiator for the Palestinians, and is based on the understandings reached at Sharm al-Sheikh in October 2000. Those understandings, accepted by both sides but not implemented, created a link between a cease-fire, stepped-up international involvement in the conflict, and resumption of the final settlement peace talks. The new proposal centers on three foundations:

• Steps for a cease-fire and abatements of the military and economic "siege" Israel imposed on the Palestinian Authority.

• Confidence-building measures, topped by a freeze on the settlements, a    renewal of security cooperation and implementation of the existing    agreements between the parties.

• Renewal of negotiations over a final agreement.

The proposal to end the violence and resume the peace process reportedly contains the following specific elements:

• Israel would lift the closures in the territories and withdraw to positions it held on the eve of the Intifada.

• Israel would freeze new settlement activity.

• The Palestinians would guarantee renewed security cooperation.

• The Palestinians would end incitement to violence.

• After a period of calm, negotiations for a final agreement will resume, with an effort to complete them within a year.

Although no longer rejecting the proposal as a "non-starter," Israel has identified some clauses which are unacceptable:

• The proposal lacks a clause requiring the Palestinians to cease their fire prior to the renewal of negotiations.

• Language used in discussing a freeze on settlements goes beyond any prior agreement with the Palestinians.

• One clause refers to a ban "on weapons forbidden by international covenants." Israel interprets that clause as an allegation of war crimes.

• Prime Minister Sharon maintains that long-term interim agreements, rather than a final-status treaty, must be reached.

The proposal has received support from European Union Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and his assistant for Middle East affairs, Ned Walker, have said that the proposal was too one-sided and needs some rewriting to meet Israeli concerns. However, the U.S. has not commented formally on the initiative, leaving the arena to its partners in the Sharm al-Sheikh forum: Egypt, Jordan, the United Nations and the European Union, all of whom have indicated support the initiative. Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa indicated on Tuesday that revisions to the plan would be considered, as long as they are not "detrimental to the principles of peace." Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is in Germany meeting with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and trying to build international support of the Egypt-Jordan initiative. Even while Egypt is lobbying for the plan, Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat accused Israel of demanding unrealistic revisions in an attempt to derail the plan. An advisor to Chairman Arafat said that the plan corresponds to the Palestinian position and is the leading effort to revitalize the peace process.

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres will travel to Egypt and Jordan to present Israel's positive response to the peace initiative. He will emphasize those elements Israel believes are critical to ending the violence and renewing negotiations: an immediate end to terror attacks and violence perpetrated by the Palestinian Authority and the creation of several projects to encourage financial interdependence. Following that trip, Peres will visit Washington to ask the U.S. administration to increase its involvement on the Israeli-Palestinian trace, to help calm local tension, and to create the conditions for resuming the political process. Reportedly he will not ask for U.S. negotiators, nor for representatives to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. He will emphasize the U.S. role as the leading strategic power in the region, with clear interests for stabilization and the ability to influence all parties. Peres will focus on U.S. economic power as a tool to affect the situation in the Middle East, specifically by helping Jordan and the Palestinians. Israel believes that the devastated Palestinian economy and the troubled Jordanian one are not in Israel's best interest. Therefore, Peres will ask the administration and Congress to create mechanisms to assist those economies. He will support the free trade act with Jordan and seek aid to Palestinians as well as revived mechanisms for international contributions to the Palestinian Authority. For Israel's part, Peres and Sharon are working on a plan to ease closures and sieges and to build a railroad line from Ashdod Port to Gaza, which would ease freedom of movement for Palestinians between towns and cities in the territories.

Each year the U.S. State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism releases a report on international terrorism. The report focuses primarily on international terrorism (rather than domestic terrorism) because of its direct impact on U.S. interests. Following are excerpts of the report, released Monday, April 30, 2001. Full text of the report can be viewed at http://www.state.gov

Middle East Overview. Middle Eastern terrorist groups and their state sponsors continued to plan, train for, and carry out acts of terrorism throughout 2000....Much of the late-year increase in violence was driven by a breakdown in negotiations and counterterrorism cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Israeli-Palestinian violence also prompted widespread anger at Israel, as well as the United States, throughout the Middle East, demonstrated in part by numerous, occasionally violent protests against U.S. interests in several Middle Eastern countries. Palestinian terrorist groups, with the assistance of Iran and the Lebanese Hizballah, took advantage of Palestinian and regional anger to escalate their terrorist attacks against Israeli targets. Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Terrorism by Palestinian extremist groups opposed to the peace process increased in late 2000 against the backdrop of violent Palestinian-Israeli clashes. The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) claimed responsibility for several attacks during the crisis, ending a period of more than two years without a large-scale successful terrorist operation. Both groups publicly threatened more anti-Israel attacks to avenge Palestinian casualties....Three little-known groups - Palestinian Hizballah, Umar al-Mukhtar Forces, and Martyrs of the al-Aqsa - [also perpetrated terrorist attacks against Israeli targets].

...Earlier in the year, PA and Israeli security forces disrupted HAMAS networks that were planning several large-scale anti-Israeli attacks....Israeli and PA security officials took additional measures, often coordinated, to further disrupt HAMAS terrorist planning....In May, PA security forces arrested Gaza military wing leader Muhammad al-Dayf. In November, Dayf escaped from PA custody. West Bank military wing leader Mahmud al-Shuli (a.k.a. Abu Hanud) surrendered to PA security officials in August...

During the unrest HAMAS issued numerous statements calling for Palestinians to fight the Israelis with all means available and threatened to continue attacks to avenge Palestinian casualties...

Despite demonstrated Palestinian efforts to uproot terrorist infrastructure earlier in the year, Israeli officials publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with PA counter-terrorism efforts during the crisis. The Israelis also accused PA security officials and Fatah members of facilitating and taking part in shooting and bombing attacks against Israeli targets...The Israelis charged that the release of several prisoners during the crisis had facilitated terrorist planning by the groups and that Palestinian security officials had not been responsive to their calls for more decisive measures against the violence.

Israeli officials publicly expressed well-founded concern that Iran supported Palestinian rejectionist efforts to disrupt the Middle East peace process. The Israelis also stated Palestinian rejectionists increasingly were influenced by Lebanese Hizballah. Public statements by HAMAS, the PIJ, and other Palestinian rejectionist officials since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May lauded Hizballah's actions and called for emulating Hizballah's victory in the territories.

Jordan. Jordan remained vigilant against terrorism in 2000. On 18 September, the State Security Court convicted several Sunni extremists...for plotting terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets during the millennium celebrations in late 1999....Jordan continued to ban all HAMAS activity...[and] refused to permit HAMAS military wing members to reside or operate in the country but allowed other lower-level HAMAS members to remain in Jordan provided they did not conduct activities on the group's behalf.

Lebanon. Throughout the year, the Lebanese Government's continued lack of control in portions of the country - including parts of the Bekaa Valley, Beirut's southern suburbs, Palestinian refugee camps, and the southern border area - as well as easy access to arms and explosives, contributed to an environment with a high potential for acts of violence and terrorism. A variety of terrorist groups - including Hizballah, Usama Bin Ladin's (UBL) al-Qaida network, HAMAS, the PIJ, the PFLP-GC, 'Asbat al-Ansar, and several local Sunni extremist organizations - continued to operate with varying degrees of impunity, conducting training and other operational activities....Hizballah voiced its support for terrorist actions by Palestinian rejectionist groups in Israel and the occupied territories. While the Lebanese Government expressed support for "resistance" activities along its southern border, it has only limited influcence over Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionists.

State-Sponsored Terrorism - Iran. ...Iran has long provided Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups - notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jeihad, and Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC - with varying amounts of funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. This activity continued at its already high levels following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May and during the intifadah in the fall. Iran continued to encourage Hizballah and the Palestinian groups to coordinate their planning and to escalate their activities against Israel.

State-Sponsored Terrorism - Syria. Syria continued to provide safehaven and support to several terrorist groups, some of which maintained training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory. Ahmad Jibril's Popular Frong for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, Abu Musa's Fatah-the-Intifada, and George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine maintained their headquarters in Damascus. The Syrian Government allowed HAMAS to open a new main office in Damascus in March....In addition, Syria granted a variety of terrorist groups - including HAMAS, the PFLP-GC, and the PIJ - basing privileges or refuge in areas of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley under Syrian control....Although Syria claimed to be committed to the peace process, it did not act to stop Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups from carrying out anti-Israeli attacks. Damscus also served as the primary transit point for terrorist operatives traveling to Lebanon and for the resupply of weapons to Hizballah.

Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The report describes in detail groups the State Department has designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Anti-Israel groups on the list, such as Hamas and Hizballah, are described in an additional briefing on our site.

Each year the U.S. State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism releases a report on international terrorism. The report focuses primarily on international terrorism (rather than domestic terrorism) because of its direct impact on U.S. interests. The report notes that "[a]dverse mention…of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national group is not meant to imply that all members of that group are terrorists." Following are the report's descriptions of groups designated as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" who target Israel. Full text of the report can be viewed at http://www.state.gov/

Abu Nidal organization (ANO). a.k.a. Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

Description/Strength/External Aid. International terrorist organization led by Sabri al-Banna. Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various functional committees, including political, military, and financial. A few hundred members plus limited overseas support structure. Has received considerable support, including safehaven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations.

Location/Area of Operation. Al-Banna relocated to Iraq in December 1988, where the group maintains a presence. Has an operational presence in Lebanon, including in several Palestinian refugee camps. Financial problems and internal disorganization have reduced the group's activities and capabilities. Authorities shut down the ANO's operations in Libya and Egypt in 1999. Has demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe.

Activities. Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1995, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in July 1988. Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. Has not attacked Western targets since the late 1980s.

HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)

Description/Strength/External Aid. Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS elements have used both political and violent means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. Loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. HAMAS's strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and a few areas of the West Bank. Also has engaged in peaceful political activity, such as running candidates in West Bank Chamber of Commerce elections. Unknown number of hard-core members; tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers. Receives funding from Palestinian expatriates, Iran, and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda activities take place in Western Europe and North America.

Location/Area of Operation. Primarily the occupied territories, Israel. In August 1999, Jordanian authorities closed the group's Political Bureau offices in Amman, arrested its leaders, and prohibited the group from operating on Jordanian territory.

Activities. HAMAS activists, especially those in the Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks - including large-scale suicide bombings - against Israeli civilian and military targets. In the early 1990s, they also targeted suspected Palestinian collaborators and Fatah rivals. Claimed several attacks during the unrest in late 2000.

Hizballah (Party of God). a.k.a. Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine

Description/Strength/External Aid. Radical Shia group formed in Lebanon; dedicated to increasing its political power in Lebanon and opposing Israel and the Middle East peace negotiations. Strongly anti-West and anti-Israel. Closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran but may have conducted operations that were not approved by Tehran. Several thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives. Receives substantial amounts of financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran and Syria.

Location/Area of Operation. Operates in the Bekaa Valley, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia.

Activities. Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-U.S. terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of U.S. and other Western hostages in Lebanon. The group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and is a suspect in the 1994 bombing of the Israeli cultural center in Buenos Aires. In fall 2000, it captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shebaa Farms and kidnapped an Israeli noncombatant whom it may have lured to Lebanon under false pretenses.

Al-Jihad. a.k.a. Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad

Description/Strength/External Aid. Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the late 1970s. Close partner of [Usama] Bin Ladin's al-Qaida organization. Suffered setbacks as a result of numerous arrests of operatives worldwide, most recently in Lebanon and Yemen. Primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and attack U.S. and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad. Not known but probably has several hundred hard-core members. [External aid] not known. The Egyptian Government claims that both Iran and Bin Ladin support the Jihad. Also may obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental organizations, cover businesses, and criminal acts.

Location/Area of Operation. Operates in the Cairo area. Has a network outside Egypt, including Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom.

Activities. Specializes in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian Government personnel, including cabinet ministers, and car-bombings against official U.S. and Egyptian facilities. The original Jihad was responsible for the assassination in 1981 of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Claimed responsibility for the attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. Has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since 1993 and has never targeted foreign tourists there. Responsible for Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad in 1995; in 1998, planned attack against U.S. Embassy in Albania was thwarted.

The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

Description/Strength/External Aid. Originated among militant Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s. Committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel though holy war. Because of its strong support for Israel, the United States has been identified as an enemy of the PIJ, but the group has not specifically conducted attacks against U.S. interests in the past. In July 2000, however, publicly threatened to attack U.S. interests if the U.S. Embassy is moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Also opposes moderate Arab governments that it believes have been tainted by Western secularism. [Strength] unknown. Receives financial assistance from Iran and limited logistic assistance from Syria.

Location/Area of Operation. Primarily Israel and the occupied territories and other parts of the Middle East, including Jordan and Lebanon. Headquartered in Syria.

Activities. Conducted at least three attacks against Israeli interests in late 2000, including one to commemorate the anniversary of former PIJ leader Fathi Shaqaqi's murder in Malta on 26 October 1995. Conducted suicide bombings against Israeli targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel.

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Description/Strength/External Aid. Broke away from the PFLP-GC [see below] in mid-1970s. Later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. Pro-PLO faction led by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), who became member of PLO Executive Committee in 1984 but left in 1991. [Strength] unknown. Receives support mainly from Iraq. Has received support from Libya in the past.

Location/Area of Operation. PLO faction based in Tunisia until Achille Lauro attack. Now based in Iraq.

Activities. The Abu Abbas-led faction is known for aerial attacks against Israel. Abbas's group also was responsible for the attack in 1985 on the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. A warrant for Abu Abbas's arrest is outstanding in Italy.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).

Description/Strength/External Aid. Split from the PFLP [see above] in 1968, claiming it wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics. Violently opposed to Arafat's PLO. Led by Ahmad Jabril, a former captain in the Syrian Army. Closely tied to both Syria and Iran. Several hundred [members]. Receives logistic and military support from Syria and financial support from Iran.

Location/Area of Operation. Headquartered in Damascus with bases in Lebanon.

Activities. Carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during 1970s-80s. Known for cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Primary focus now on guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon, small-scale attacks in Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip.

al-Qaida.

Description/Strength/External Aid. Established by Usama Bin Ladin in the late 1980s to bring together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Current goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems "non-Islamic" and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. Issued statement under banner of "the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders" in February 1998, saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens - civilian or military - and their allies everywhere. May have several hundred to several thousand members. Also serves as a focal point or umbrella organization for a worldwide network that includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad, some members of al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin. Bin Ladin, son of a billionaire Saudi family, is said to have inherited approximately $300 million that he uses to finance the group. Al-Qaida also maintains moneymaking front organizations, solicits donations from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations.

Location/Area of Operation. Al-Qaida has a worldwide reach, has cells in a number of countries, and is reinforced by its ties to Sunni extremist networks. Bin Ladin and his key lieutenants reside in Afghanistan, and the group maintains terrorist training camps there.

Activities. Plotted to carry out terrorist operations against U.S. and Israeli tourists visiting Jordan for millennial celebrations. (Jordanian authorities thwarted the planned attacks and put 28 suspects on trial.) Conducted the bombings in August 1998 of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that killed at least 301 persons and injured more than 5,000 others. Claims to have shot down U.S. helicopters and killed U.S. servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to have conducted three bombings that targeted U.S. troops in Aden, Yemen, in December 1992. Linked to the following plans that were not carried out: to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his visit to Manila in late 1994, simultaneous bombings of the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in Manila and other Asian capitals in late 1994, the midair bombing of a dozen U.S. trans-Pacific flights in 1995, and to kill President Clinton during a visit to the Philippines in early 1995. Continues to train, finance, and provide logistic support to terrorist groups in support of these goals.