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JCRC Middle East Briefings

Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based news channel, held a debate in mid-November on the future of the Intifada and a Palestinian state. Participants were: Yasser Abd Rabbo, Palestine Authority Minister of Information; Musa Abu Marzuq, deputy head of Hamas' political bureau; and Bilal Al-Hassan, a journalist for the London-based daily Al-Hayat, representing the Palestinian left. Following are excerpts as reported by the Middle East Media & Research Institute. For additional details, see http://memri.org/news.html.

Borders and the Nature of a Palestinian State

Abd Rabbo: Refused to elaborate on what will happen once a Palestinian state is established within the 1967 borders. He would not elaborate on the issues of whether Israel would continue to be a state after establishment of a Palestinian state.

Abu Marzuq: Hamas has no objection to such a state, but the 1967 borders would not be final borders. He stated: "We must further aspire for borders that will include Palestine in its entirety."

Al-Hassan: Explained that the desire is for a unified Palestinian state, which can come about through peace or war. The establishment will be peaceful if the Israelis accept a unified democratic Palestinian state.

Intifada Tactics

Abd Rabbo: President Arafat did not issue orders to restrain from shooting Israelis. He said that shooting from population centers gives Israelis an excuse to strike back. Therefore, shooting from population centers, which does not result in any gain, should be stopped. He disagreed with Abu Marzuq, stating that using all means against Israel "will surely lead to suicide or sacrifice of the Intifada."

Abu Marzuq: Found it difficult to deal with the limitations on using firearms, asking why the Palestine Authority keeps 30,000 rifles.

Al-Hassan: Agreed with Abd Rabbo. He stated that the means to continue the struggle over a long period of time should not be exhausted too quickly.

Note: This briefing was prepared Tuesday, Dec. 26, 2000, before the Dec. 27 deadline by which Israelis and Palestinians are to give the United States their response to President Clinton's proposal. Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat are scheduled to discuss it Dec. 28 in Egypt. Barak has stated he is prepared to accept it with minor reservations if Arafat does. Ariel Sharon has stated that if elected Prime Minister, he will not honor any agreement signed by Barak. President Clinton, who leaves office January 20th, has warned that if the proposal is rejected, he will drop all further involvement in negotiations. If accepted, the deadline for an agreement would be January 10th. Gen. Colin Powell, President-elect Bush's choice for Secretary of State, told Israeli officials that the Bush administration prefers that President Clinton conclude a deal now.

The wide-ranging proposals presented by the Clinton Administration are intended to be the basis for a comprehensive agreement which would end the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The proposals have not been formally written down, suggesting that if they are rejected, they will not form the basis of future negotiating.

Temple Mount: One of the proposals centered on Israel ceding sovereignty of the Temple Mount to the Palestinians. The Palestinians would be forbidden to conduct archaeological digs and would acknowledge the "Jewish connection" to the site. Israel wants partial sovereignty or other rights over the underground portions of the Temple Mount. The Palestinians object to this plan, which Palestinian negotiator Yasser Abed Rabbo called a verbal trick. Barak has promised to present Israel's response regarding the Temple Mount and Jerusalem to Israel's Chief Rabbis and consider their stands.

Jerusalem: The Western Wall, the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and most of the Armenian Quarter would remain under Israeli control. Arab neighborhoods would become part of Palestine and the Jewish neighborhoods would remain part of Israel. According to some estimates, Israel would give back about five-eighths of the Old City. New neighborhoods like Maale Adumim would be incorporated into Jewish Jerusalem.

Refugees: Palestinian refugees would return to their "homeland," specified as the new Palestinian state. Israeli news reports state that Israel would be prepared to absorb tens of thousands of refugees, although no number has been specified. Israel would participate in an international program for compensation and resettlement of refugees to third countries. President Clinton has made it clear that there will be no agreement if the Palestinians insist on the right of return for refugees. Abed Rabbo said that the Palestinians would reject any decision on the refugees not based on U.N. resolutions. This is potentially the most difficult issue for Arafat, who is aware that accepting the deal would end one of the dreams that has fueled the Palestinian national movement. In addition, without the right of return, neighboring Arab countries could find themselves left with nearly 2 million refugees in Jordan and Lebanon.

Settlements/Palestinian State: One of the estimates proposes that the Palestinian state include 95 percent of the West Bank. Israeli news reports suggest that 80 percent of settlers now on the West Bank would be on sites annexed to Israel and that Israel would compensate for what the Palestinians did not get on the West Bank with part of the Negev. The Palestinians want 96 or 97 percent of the West Bank and, according to Abed Rabbo, would not agree to Jewish settlements on 6 percent of West Bank land. Ha'aretz reports that Israel has agreed to a plan drafted by the World Bank, under which settlers' homes, fields and public buildings evacuated under an agreement would be sold to Palestinian Authority residents. Estimates say that annexation of 5 percent of the West Bank would force the evacuation of 25 percent of the settlers (Prime Minister Barak claims that 20 percent would be evacuated).

Future Status: Acceptance of this proposal would be an end to the conflict, meaning that neither side could make more claims on the other afterward.

On January 20, 2001, George W. Bush will be inaugurated 43rd President of the United States. He has designated Gen. Colin Powell as his Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and Dr. Condoleezza Rice as National Security Advisor. Although the new administration faces significant turmoil in the Middles East, most analysts expect that Bush will not devote the same level of time or energy to the Middle East conflict that the Clinton Administration has. While details remain scarce on the new administration's foreign policy plans, there is general consensus that this foreign policy team is highly qualified and respected.

The new Intifada, which began in September, has de-railed the peace process in spite of the all-out effort by President Clinton to complete a peace agreement before he leaves office on January 20th. With Israeli elections on February 6th threatening Prime Minister Ehud Barak's tenure, and Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat's control being questioned, the future is as uncertain as ever.

President-elect George W. Bush has limited experience in foreign affairs, but he has voiced strong support for Israel and for the United States to continue as mediator in peace negotiations. Bush includes among a myriad of foreign policy priorities, "defend[ing] America's interests in the Persian Gulf and [advancing] peace in the Middle East, based upon a secure Israel." Details on that policy are scarce. During his campaign, Bush, who recently visited Israel for the first time, promised that the first thing he would do is move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Whether he will act on that promise remains to be seen. He has stated that he will not impose a timetable for a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, believing that President Clinton may have pushed the parties too quickly. Israeli sources have been quoted as projecting that Bush will take a "less sentimental" approach and is more likely to serve as final arbiter over the activities of his foreign policy team rather than be as deeply involved in setting U.S. policy on the Middle East as Clinton has been.

Secretary of State Designee Gen. Colin Powell was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War and reportedly developed a good relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee in 1991, Powell said, "Let there never be any question about our commitment to Israel. And let there be no question that America will stand by Israel in whatever the future holds." In accepting the nomination for Secretary of State, Powell said that the Middle East would remain a high priority and that he would work on the basic "principle that we must always ensure that Israel lives in freedom and in security and in peace." At the same time, however, he acknowledged theneed to address the aspirations of the Palestinians and Arab countries. During the Gulf War, questions about his support for Israel arose as he hesitated to fight against Iraq, raising concerns about his reluctance to use American strength to thwart international conflict.

Secretary of Defense Designee Donald H. Rumsfeld, described as a foreign policy hawk and social conservative, was Secretary of Defense under President Ford from 1975 to 1977 and special ambassador to the Middle East for seven months under President Reagan. Jewish activists do not remember him being particularly involved in Middle East issues. In 1998, Rumsfeld chaired the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threats to theUnited States, which found that Iraq and Iran could be developing weapons of mass destruction which could be used with little warning. As a result, he has become a leading advocate for a national missile defense program. This could bode well for the Arrow missile program, the most advanced joint U.S.-Israel military project. Arrow is the only operational system that has consistently proven that one missile can shoot down another at high altitudes and speeds.

National Security Advisor Designee Dr. Condoleezza Rice has reiterated Bush's position that the United States will stand in solidarity with Israel, but has also said that there would be no timetable for pressing the parties toward a peace agreement. Rice, who was on the National Security Council during the previous Bush administration, is an expert on Russia with little experience in the Middle East, but has been praised as an advocate for Soviet Jewry and for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship. Rice has argued that U.S. foreign policy should not be based on humanitarian interests, but rather on what is in the United States' own interest - spreading democracy and free trade.

Additional Efforts on Behalf of Kidnapped Israelis:

The International Coalition for Missing Israeli Soldiers has launched an international petition drive. The non-profit, non-partisan body is dedicated to keeping this humanitarian cause on the international agenda. The petition and background information can be found at http://www.mia.org.il/.

The Palestinians' claim of a "right of return" to Israel has become one of the most significant obstacles to a final peace agreement. The refugee issue is serious and complex, and must be understood within the context of the region's modern history.

The refugee problem began in 1947 when the Arab countries refused to accept the partition of Palestine into two states - one Jewish, one Palestinian (U.N. Resolution 181). Instead, they initiated a war which resulted in the creation of the state of Israel - and a refugee problem.

The Arab countries (except Jordan) never accepted the refugees, never absorbed them into society nor provided for their welfare. They were kept in crowded camps, where many remain over 50 years later. Conversely, Israel absorbed Jewish refugees who were forced from Arab countries, leaving behind vast property and wealth. They were never compensated, and Israel never renounced its right to submit compensation claims against the Arab countries.

The Palestinians claim that U.N. resolution 194 requires Israel to grant the refugees the right of return. The resolution, which established the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine and called for the internationalization and demilitarization of Jerusalem, mentions refugees in only one of its 15 articles. A right of return for the refugees is never mentioned. Rather, it makes the return of refugees conditional on two things: 1) that the refugees are interested in living in peace with their neighbors, and 2) the return take place "at the earliest practicable date." Experience does not weigh favorably on the first condition, and demographic and geographic conditions indicate that it is not practicable for such a large number of Arab refugees to return to Israel.

Resolution 194 calls for compensation for those who choose not to return or whose property has been destroyed or damaged. The compensation is to be provided by "the governments or authorities responsible." Israel is not specifically mentioned, and the use of plural wording indicates that, contrary to Palestinian claims, the burden of compensation does not fall solely upon Israel.

Israel is not responsible for the creation of the refugee problem, nor for perpetuating it. To accept responsibility would have far-reaching implications: 1) It would encourage the arrival of millions of Palestinian refugees in the State of Israel, changing the demographics of the country in such a way as to effectively end the existence of the independent Jewish state; 2) It would be used as a basis for claims against Israel for compensation for loss of property and for 52 years of suffering; 3) It would facilitate claims by Arab "host countries" against Israel for compensation for the cost of "hosting" the refugees.

On February 6th, Israelis will go to the polls to elect the Prime Minister - current Prime Minister Ehud Barak or Likud party leader Ariel Sharon. In 1996, Israeli voters began separately electing members of the Knesset and the prime minister during the same general elections. Next month will be the first time Israelis will vote for a prime minister without electing a new Knesset.

Ehud Barak's Resignation. The resignation of Prime Minister Ehud Barak, effective December 12, 2000, forced new elections within 60 days. There was speculation that Barak's resignation was a political move aimed at preventing Benjamin Netanyahu from opposing Barak. According to Israeli law at the time, only sitting members of the Knesset could run for prime minister. On December 19th the Knesset passed legislation allowing someone who is not a member to run for prime minister. Some analysts have raised concerns that this law could throw the Israeli parliamentary system into crisis because it could be challenged in Israel's Supreme Court.

Dissolution of the Knesset. In the days prior to Barak's resignation, the Knesset considered dissolving itself, which would have forced new general elections. Opinion polls at the time showed that right-leaning parties, including Likud, would substantially gain in elections. On the other hand, Shas, the Sephardi religious party, feared it would lose seats and therefore voted against dissolution.

Benjamin Netanyahu. Although he was leading Barak by a wide margin in the polls, former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced he would not run for Prime Minister without general elections. Analysts were not surprised by his position, since general elections would likely have resulted in a Knesset much more favorable to Netanyahu than the current make-up.

Shimon Peres. Former Prime Minister Shimon Peres announced his candidacy for Prime Minister on December 20. Peres needed the support of 10 Knesset members to run, and he expected the support of the Meretz party. However, on December 21, Meretz decided not to nominate Peres for prime minister, leaving Barak as the only candidate from the Left. In recent days, there has been a renewed call for Barak to step aside and let Peres run. Barak can do so up until 96 hours before the election. Peres has asked his supporters to cease their call for him to replace Barak as the Left's candidate, but speculation continues that a Peres candidacy may occur.

Ariel Sharon. Likud party leader Ariel Sharon holds a significant lead over Barak in the polls. Peres is running much closer to Sharon in the polls, but many doubt that Peres would be victorious. Sharon is controversial, reviled by the Palestinians and many Israeli Leftists, stemming from his service as Minister of Defense under Menachem Begin in the early '80s. Sharon masterminded Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and was held responsible for massacres in the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila in September 1982.

AFTER THE ELECTION

Both Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon claim to be the only one who can bring peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Both also have plans for how Israel can unilaterally separate the economy and infrastructure (electricity, water, etc.) of Israel and Palestinian areas.

Barak's Peace Plan. Prime Minister Ehud Barak has accepted as a guideline for negotiations the plan proposed by President Clinton. This includes shared sovereignty over the Temple Mount; the division of Jerusalem, with Israel controlling the Jewish areas and the Palestinians controlling Arab neighborhoods; the determination of borders of a Palestinian state; no right of return for the Palestinian refugees; and the declared end of the conflict. (See Middle East Briefing #12 for additional information.)

Barak's Unilateral Separation Plan. Barak's plan for separation from the Palestinians would go into effect only under one of three scenarios: the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, a severe security threat, or an agreement with the Palestinian Authority. The plan calls for a line of defense around settlements in the West Bank that would be annexed under a permanent peace agreement. Isolated settlements would also remain under Israeli control, as would a wide security zone in the Jordan Valley. The plan avoids irreversible actions, proposing to use mobile military forces and obstacles around the settlements instead of electronic fences. The plan further details legal and administrative infrastructure for incorporating the settlements into Israel and determines how infrastructure shared with the Palestinian Authority would be redeployed. There is not yet a plan to evacuate isolated settlements in the event of unilateral separation or an agreement with the Palestinians.

Sharon's Peace Plan. Sharon has released few details of how he would achieve peace with the Palestinians. His statements indicate his main points would be a united Jerusalem, no evacuation of settlements, and Israel retaining sovereignty over the entire Jordan Valley. Sharon has declared that the Oslo accord, which set forth guidelines for peace negotiations in 1993, no longer is valid because the Palestinians resorted to violence rather than worked to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. Sharon is opposed to a permanent settlement, preferring a long-term interim arrangement in which a Palestinian state would be established in the areas of the West Bank already under full or partial Palestinian control.

Sharon's Unilateral Separation Plan. According to the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, Sharon believes that a unilateral separation plan should be prepared but implemented only if the Palestinian Authority unilaterally declares a state. Sharon's separation line would leave Israel in control of West Bank areas not currently under Palestinian control; a wide security zone in the east (Jordan Valley and Judean Desert); and a narrow buffer zone in the west (Samarian and Judean mountains along the Green Line). Sharon also proposes that Israeli forces be deployed in certain areas to prevent the Palestinians from seizing Israeli-controlled areas of the West Bank.

On February 6, 2001, Israelis will elect a new prime minister. Polls continue to show Ariel Sharon with a commanding lead over Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Sharon may be a polarizing figure, not only in Israel and the rest of the Middle East, but in our community as well.

Our Mandate as American Jews

Regardless of the outcome of the Israeli election, our mandate is clear:

• to support the democratically-elected government of Israel in its efforts for peace and security.

• to remind the world that Israelis express their feelings about the peace process in how they vote, not by unleashing violent attacks on innocent civilians.

• to continue to work with our Congressional representatives and the Bush administration to ensure that the United States maintains its special relationship with Israel and remains its strongest ally.

Above all, we need to remember that Israel is a democracy. Unlike its neighbors, where the sons of previous leaders automatically ascended to leadership, the choice of leaders reflects the will of the Israeli people. We must respect every Israeli's right to make his or her choice and support the government they elect.

The Elections and the Peace Process

Barak may not have been in touch with the feelings of Israelis or his own government on how far to go to achieve peace. The election has become a referendum on his approach, and he may end up paying the ultimate political price.

In an attempt to achieve a peace agreement with the Palestinians, Barak offered more compromises and concessions than any other Israeli leader had been willing to. But those who believed in Barak's offers at Camp David lost their faith in Yasser Arafat as a peace partner when the Palestinians unleashed their Intifada that began in late September.

What a Sharon victory could mean

If elected, Sharon may be able to bring enough parties together to gain a 61-seat Knesset majority and therefore form a coalition government. He has also talked about forming a government of national unity, in which his Likud Party would join with Barak's Labor Party to form a majority, although Barak has said he would not join a government with Sharon. Some analysts predict that the Knesset will dissolve itself in relatively short time after the elections, forcing new elections for both the Prime Minister and the Knesset.

Although Sharon has been reviled as the mastermind behind Israel's invasion of Lebanon as well as for his complacency in the massacres at the Sabra and Shtila refugee camps, he has also been central to Israel's peace-making efforts. He supported Prime Minister Menachem Begin's efforts to make peace with Egypt at Camp David. And while he has been a proponent of Israeli settlement in the territories, he oversaw the evacuation of the Jewish settlement of Yamit as a result of the peace treaty with Egypt.

The media will likely portray him as bent on derailing the peace process. Sharon has not been forthcoming with his plans for peace. While he may not be prepared to make the same compromises that Barak put on the table, there is no reason to assume that his election will bring the peace process to a halt. While average Palestinians hate Sharon and blame him for the Sabra and Shatila massacres, Arab leaders trust him. They believe that Sharon is straightforward with them - a feeling they did not get from his Likud predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu.

A chance for Ehud Barak

There is, of course, still a chance that Barak could be re-elected. There are a number of undecided voters, and Arab-Israeli voters could decide to call off their election boycott and support Barak - something Yasser Abed Rabbo, a top Palestinian Authority official, has advocated.

If Barak wins, it will be considered a mandate to continue on his current path - and there are promising developments. Talks in Taba last week, while not resulting in a final agreement, have reportedly shown progress in discussions on difficult issues, including Jerusalem and the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

On Tuesday, February 06, 2001, Israelis elected Likud chairman Ariel Sharon as Prime Minister by a vote of 62.5% to 37.5%. Voter turnout was barely 60%, the lowest in Israel's history. Only 25% of Arab Israelis voted, and of those, 25% voted for Sharon. In a concession speech, Ehud Barak announced that he would resign his Knesset seat and the chairmanship of the Labor Party.

Ariel Sharon. Born September 27, 1928, in Kfar Malal, Ariel Sharon is a widower and father of two sons. He holds a law degree from Tel Aviv University and speaks Hebrew, English and Russian. His registered profession is farmer. After achieving the rank of major-general in the Israel Defense Forces, Sharon was elected to the Knesset in 1974. He was special advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin from June 1975 until March 1976. In Menachem Begin's first government, Sharon was given the agriculture portfolio and oversaw the establishment of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. In April 1982, Sharon led the evacuation of Pithat Rafiah, scheduled to be handed over to Egypt. He was the last Israeli soldier to leave the Sinai settlement of Yamit before it was turned over to Egypt. He served as minister of defense in June 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon in an effort to counter terrorism, establish a legal Lebanese government that would sign a peace treaty with Israel, and drive the Syrians from Beirut.

In September 1982, Sharon allowed Lebanese Christian Phalangists to enter the refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila to search for terrorists. The resulting massacre of the refugees led to an Israeli commission finding that Sharon did not do enough to prevent the incident. He was forced to resign as defense minister. In later governments, Sharon served as minister of industry and trade and of construction and housing. In Benjamin Netanyahu's government, Sharon was given the national infrastructure portfolio and then named foreign minister. Upon Netanyahu's loss to Ehud Barak and resignation from the Knesset in 1999, Sharon took over leadership of the Likud party. What Happens Next? Ariel Sharon now has 45 days (until March 30) to form a coalition, or new elections will be held by April 15th. With the Likud holding only 19 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, Sharon will have to convince several parties to join his government. One option, which Sharon has advocated, is the formation of a unity government in which the Labor party would be his primary partner; Ehud Barak would likely be offered the defense ministry and Shimon Peres the foreign ministry. If he cannot form a unity government, Sharon will have to form a more narrow coalition which could present other problems. By Israeli law, the Knesset must pass a budget by March 31st. Shas, with 17 seats in the Knesset, is a likely coalition partner with serious budget demands. If the budget is not passed, the Knesset is dissolved by law, and elections for both the Knesset and the Prime Minister are held within 90 days.

Arab Reaction. Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat indicated that he does not think that the election of Ariel Sharon automatically means an end to the peace process. Arafat said the Palestinians "respect the choice of the Israeli people, and hope the peace process will continue." The most severe Arab reaction came from Lebanon, where Sharon's election was condemned and there were calls for trying Sharon for the 1982 invasion and the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. The Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, appears be taking a wait-and-see position. Hamas and Hezbollah declared that they saw no difference between Barak and Sharon, calling both "butchers." The Syrians reiterated that peace between Israel and Syria depends on Israel's full withdrawal from "occupied" Arab lands. King Abdullah of Jordan has been working in recent days to alleviate fears in Jordan that its stability would be threatened by a Sharon victory. He told a cabinet meeting the day before the election the outcome would not affect Jordan. U.S. Response. The Bush administration made clear it would not intervene in the campaign. Bush is not expected to become personally involved in the Middle East peace process to the extent that former President Clinton did. The administration is now working to learn as much as possible about Sharon's diplomatic plans and to arrange an official invitation to Washington. Bush congratulated Sharon in a five-minute phone call. Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer declared the U.S.-Israel relationship "rock solid," and Secretary of State Colin Powell called for calm, encouraging leaders and people in the region to "refrain from any acts that would lead to violence." The International Press. While many world leaders have tempered their reactions to Sharon's election, the international press has reacted strongly. The British Independent, wrote that "for once, the nation that so often points to the bloodstained hands of its Arab enemies will have its very own home-grown blood-spattered leader." The Times of London observed that Israelis were stunned by the ferocity of the Palestinian revolt and therefore opted for Sharon "because the immediate threat to their personal security was plainly a more relevant concern than the pursuit of a political dialogue in which compromise seemed impossible." France's left-of-center Libération daily summed up the result in an ominous headline on its front page: "Sharon the Threat." France's Le Monde more moderately stated that neither Israelis nor Palestinians were convinced by Barak's peace efforts. Jordan's al-Aswaq daily talked of extremism in Israel, but Saudi Arabia's al-Medina newspaper opined that Sharon and Barak differed little in their ultimate approach, calling both "butchers."

Even before the election was final, the Israeli Foreign Ministry began preparing its public relations efforts to explain the Sharon victory. The campaign will focus on countering expected Arab attacks on Sharon's record, which Arabs hope will isolate Israel and pressure it into diplomatic concessions. The Foreign Ministry is poised to place blame on Yasser Arafat for backing the violence in the territories. It will argue that the Palestinian violence shook Israeli confidence in their security, thus leading to the rise of Sharon.

1. The Prime Minister of Israel is directly elected by the citizens of the State, including, if they choose to participate, its Arab citizens. Israel is the only nation in the region to have truly free and open elections. We should expect that the choice of a free electorate be respected. We should also understand that Sharon must work with the existing Knesset, and that will require compromise and accommodation with different points of view if he expects to adopt any sort of legislative agenda and avoid new elections, for both the Prime Minister and Knesset, in the very near future. Indeed, Sharon has suggested on numerous occasions that he would like to create a national unity government that includes Barak's Labour Party.

2. The Oslo Agreement of 1993 was premised on confidence-building measures between two hostile peoples that would lead to an eventual bridging of the gaps between them and lead the parties to an agreement on the most contentious issues by the year 2000. Two years ago, Barak's election was a mandate for making that final peace agreement. That was the basis for his campaign and that was the path he pursued. Unfortunately, and perhaps predictably, the differences between the Palestinians and Israelis are deeper and more fundamental than the Oslo process contemplated. And the recent orchestrated violence by the Palestinian Authority, after Barak's far-reaching offers for a final agreement, destroyed any confidence that the Israeli public, including those most inclined to accept a painful agreement with the Palestinians, had that the Palestinians and the Arab world actually want a peace that includes a Jewish state. In this sense, the choice of Sharon (a hardliner who, nonetheless, ran on a "peace" campaign) as PM is rational. His pledge not to negotiate under the threat of continued violence represents a basic understanding of the fundamental principle of Oslo - that the two sides must trust each other before there can peace, and the Israeli public cannot, and should not, trust the Palestinians until they clearly and totally foreswear violence and provocation as a negotiating tool. Essentially, if you listen to his position and ignore the rhetoric, Sharon wants peace, but will act cautiously given the positions of the other side and its willingness to resort to violence and propaganda. Anyone doubting the reasonableness of this position should look at the recent history of another supposedly intractable problem, a solution for Northern Ireland. In that case, major steps forward were made when all parties, even the most radical elements on each side, accepted that violence was not the answer.

3. The Likud Party, which Sharon leads, has, albeit reluctantly, accepted the concept of a final accord with the Palestinians on the basis of a process, if not the timetable, outlined in Oslo. For instance, the last Likud Prime Minister, Bibi Netanyahu, signed the Wye River interim accord and withdrew Israeli troops from Hebron. The concept of an independent Palestinian state, with acceptable security guarantees for Israel, is no longer anathema to the vast majority of the Israeli public.

4. At Camp David, Ehud Barak offered the most far-reaching proposals ever, but in the context of a definitive "end of the conflict." Most disheartening to all Israelis, the Palestinians explicitly rejected the idea that the conflict could end if the so-called "right of return," a claim that would extinguish a Jewish Israel, was also eliminated. Even worse, from the Israeli perspective, the Arab nations made it clear that the Palestinians could not, without Arab consensus, accept Barak's proposals. How, many Israelis ask, can you make peace with someone who wants to eliminate you and may not even have the power to end the regional conflict? Even so, many Israelis have come to accept that a comprehensive peace will require painful and difficult agreements that would have been considered completely taboo only a few years ago. Perhaps they would have been acceptable to a majority of Israelis if Arafat and his Arab partners had not simply scoffed at Barak's proposals and initiated the current violence. In this regard, it is useful to note that Palestinian human rights activist Bassem Eid was quoted in the New York Times of February 6th as follows " ..Arafat put an end to Barak's political career (through official Palestinian encouragement of the violent uprising)..He killed him. Deliberately."

5. Nations and peoples cannot effectively wage a war or forge a peace without popular consent. In the last several years, the Israeli public has matured in its thinking about the compromises and sacrifices needed to achieve the end of the conflict. After all, Barak's proposals did not produce hysteria in Israel or send people into the streets. Unfortunately, all of the evidence we have from the other side shows that the PA is not preparing its people to live alongside Israel in peace. In fact, they are doing exactly the opposite:

• curricular materials written by the PA and newly introduced into Palestinian-run schools for the 2000-2001 year reflect an unyielding hatred of Jews, Judaism and Israel

• despite agreements to the contrary, official PA media is filled with incitement against Israel and Jews

• Muslim religious authorities fulminate against Israel

• The PA runs "summer camps" in which young students are given military training and taught to kill

    

• "martyrdom" is extolled as a goal, especially for young people

• denying the Jewish religious claim to Jerusalem and the Temple Mount

• the conflict is increasingly presented as a battle between Islam and Judaism

6. Americans and the rest of the world should take Arab indignation with Sharon with a large grain of salt. He is the elected leader of a democracy. Israelis did not go running into the streets to protest the ascension of Assad's ophthalmologist son, without a free election, to the presidency of Syria, a recognized terrorist state. Israelis have negotiated with Arafat, a former terrorist who continues to encourage violence, even during negotiations for peace. The world wants Israel to accept that Arafat, an autocratic leader of a corrupt organization that steals from its own people, can be an acceptable peace partner. Arafat is a "hardliner," the epithet most often applied to Sharon. The world should give Sharon the same level of deference that it accords his adversary. And, the world should remember, peace is often made not by concession, but an understanding of strategic necessities and a balance of power.

Note: the Palestinian insistence on "right of return" is understood for exactly what it is: a euphemism for national suicide. There is no such "right" in international law; Paragraph 11 of UN general Assembly Resolution 194 enacted in 1948 says only that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date…" The Arab states originally rejected the resolution, which in toto foresaw a final settlement of all outstanding questions between the parties.

Since his election as Israeli prime minister on February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon has been pressing for a government of national unity - a coalition with the Labor party. Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who initially resigned as head of the Labor party, has been leading the talks with Sharon. Following is a description of the draft agreement as reported in the Israeli daily, Ha'aretz. According to Ha'aretz, the outline, drafted by Interior Minister Haim Ramon and Gideon Sa'ar, expected to be Sharon's cabinet secretary, has already been approved by Sharon. Barak has approved most of the clauses. A final agreement could be reached as early as Tuesday, February 13, 2001.

Outline of the agreement:

Compromises have been made on both sides. Likud has reportedly agreed to drop several central points of the campaign - the unity of Jerusalem, Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount and the Jordan Valley, and Israel's opposition to a "right of return" for Palestinian refugees. Labor agreed to eliminate two of its primary demands - acceptance in principle of the possibility that isolated settlements could be evacuated unilaterally, and support for the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state.

Following are the clauses of the draft agreement:

1. Israel will honor previous diplomatic agreements approved by the Knesset, as long as they are also honored by the other side.
2. Israel will seek permanent agreements with the Syrians, the Palestinians and the Lebanese on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 338.
3. Israel will work to advance peace with the Palestinian Authority through interim agreements.
4. Achieving peace will require painful compromises on both sides.
5. Within the framework of the interim agreements, the possibility of a redeployment in the territories of Judea, Sumaria and Gaza will be examined.
6. No new settlements will be established.
7. Strengthening existing settlements will be done on the basis of their natural growth.
8. The government will supply an answer for the settlements' ongoing needs.

Not a sure thing:

The agreement is far from finalized. Some members of the Labor party are concerned that Barak might back out at the last minute. And, in fact, a later Ha'aretz report indicates that Barak wants to include the creation of a Palestinian state and the readiness to evacuate isolated settlements for security or diplomatic reasons to the guidelines. In addition, it is not guaranteed that the agreement, as it stands, would be passed by Labor's central committee. Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami has also expressed his opposition to a unity government, as has Justice Minister Yossi Beilin. Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may be an obstacle on the Likud side. Ha'aretz reports that sources close to Sharon believe that Netanyahu is working to foil establishment of a unity government in order to hasten the government's downfall and thus allow him to attempt to oust Sharon from party leadership. Netanyahu loyalist, MK Yisrael Katz, has called a conference of Likud's central committee in an attempt to oppose giving Barak the Defense Ministry (which Sharon has offered) and to compromising Likud's principles for an agreement with Labor.

What would a unity government look like?

At this time, a unity government would reportedly include 28 to 30 ministers, including: eight ministers from Likud and Labor, five from Shas, one from the National Religious Party, one from Yisrael b'Aliyah and one from Yisrael Beiteinu. Additionally, MK Dan Meridor (Center), MK David Levy (Gesher), Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert and one Arab minister would also be included. If United Torah Judaism changes its tradition of declining ministerships, they could be included, and the Center Party could get a second ministry if the entire party joins the government. The current government has only 21 ministerial portfolios, so seven to nine of the ministers in the proposed unity government would be without portfolio.

In their own words: Arab reaction to Sharon

PA presidential spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeina: "What we are concerned with is that a Sharon-led government pursues the path of peace. We will deal with Sharon as a Prime Minister, not as a general who led the Lebanon war."

Hamas official Khaled Meshaal: "Sharon and Barak are the same, but Barak is trying to deceive us and to lure Western support while Sharon will reveal the real Zionist image, with its lust for wars and killing, and will lose internationally. The Arabs should be prepared for all options. If peace comes we welcome it, but if there is no peace our choice should be resistance."

Bethlehem TV owner Raed Othman: "He will be a more difficult counterpart but I think he is more capable of making peace."

Israel has set up a State Commission of Inquiry into the events of October 2000, during which 13 Israeli Arabs were killed in clashes with police. The three-member panel is holding public sessions and hearing testimony. The commission is headed by Justice Theodore Or. The other two members are Judge Sahal Jarakh and Professor Shimon Shamir. Commission investigators interviewed residents of Arab villages and towns in the Galilee and held meetings with policemen involved in quelling the riots.

Open sessions of the hearing began Monday, February 19th at the Supreme Court and are being reported on by the Israeli daily newspaper, Ha'aretz. Excerpts from the Ha'aretz reports, authored by Baruch Kra, follow:

"The [opening] session…was marked by violent outbursts of emotion by the family of [a] youth killed in the rioting in Jatt. The commission heard, among other things, that the only riot-control equipment used by the Border Patrol in Jatt last October 1 consisted of rubber-coated bullets, and that no effort was made by the green-uniformed police troopers to use any other means, including loudspeakers, to get the crowd to disperse.

"The outburst by the family of the late Rami Jara included his father's attack on the border patrolman who allegedly shot his son…and shoving and pushing by Jara family members and court security. Justice Theodor Or…ordered the courtroom cleared, and testimony only resumed in the afternoon after Arab MKs and lawyers for the families promised there would be no more outbursts." The police plan to ask Justice Or to allow them to testify with their identities shielded from the audience, reportedly out of concern that victims' family members will seek retribution. Members of the anti-terror special forces have already received such permission.

"Testimony…revealed discrepancies [among Israeli police accounts] of events….One of the policemen…said two of his soldiers received orders from the force commander to move on the demonstrators and hit at least one of them with a rubber bullet 'as a deterrence.'…All the troopers admitted they made no use of any equipment to deter the demonstrators, including tear gas, or loudspeakers urging them to disperse.

"Testimony by [the Israeli] force commander…revealed that he did not know the basic rules of using rubber bullets, and he was unable to explain to the panel why he sent a two-member force to try to disperse a crowd of at least several dozen demonstrators. There were also discrepancies between his testimony…and what he told the commission's investigators, as well as his testimony at the trial of one of the arrested demonstrators….

"[The commander] admitted…that he gave the order for the two [policemen] to shoot at one of the demonstrators in order to deter the rest. The troopers testified that, when they reached a point
about 15 meters away from Rami Jara, they were noticed by the civilian demonstrators, who began throwing rocks at them."

The policemen and three civilians testified that "the rock-throwers were several meters from where Jara was standing, on the main road into the village, near a café where some others were standing peacefully watching the events."

During testimony on Tuesday, residents of Umm el Fahm said that the police who fired on them were 200 to 700 meters from the demonstrators and therefore in no danger. Justice Or was suspicious, however, that their testimony had been coached, because the testimony included details that had not been included in written documents submitted to the commission.

"In other testimony…, the acting mayor…and deputy mayor of the town…claimed the police refused to give them any opportunity to try to subdue the rioting, which, they said, led to the injuries. [The acting mayor] said at one point he got a phone call from the Shin Bet reporting one of the demonstrators had been shot in the head, so he called one of the police commanders on the scene, who told him that the junction had to be cleared 'at all costs.'"

When the acting mayor asserted that the police had been ordered to shoot to kill, Justice Or interjected and asked if there was any evidence of that. The mayor responded, "It was what I felt."

BACKGROUND ON THE ISRAELI ARAB RIOTS

In October, coinciding with the Palestinian Intifada, the Israeli Arab community held demonstrations in several Israeli cities. When the police responded, violence erupted at several demonstrations, resulting in the deaths of 13 Israeli Arabs. It is the responsibility of the Or Commission to determine whether the Israeli police acted appropriately in its response. While the demonstrations originally appeared to be held in solidarity with the Palestinians, Israeli Arab leadership has asserted that they were voicing long-held grievances about discrimination they face in Israeli society. The situation of Israel's 1 million Arab citizens has long been recognized as an issue that must be addressed. Israeli Arabs do not serve in the Israeli army, which puts them, as individuals, at a significant disadvantage in the Israeli social structure. In addition, government budget disparities in education and infrastructure result in a standard of living for Arab Israelis that is generally lower than that of most Jewish Israelis.